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Abstract
Recently electronic health (eHealth) care system has drawn a lot of attention from
the research community and the industry to face the challenge of rapidly growing elderly
population and ever rising health care spending. The health care sector is also driven by
the need to reduce costs while simultaneously increasing the service of quality for patients,
especially extending health care to patient’s residence. Advances in wireless body area
networks (WBANs) have made it possible to monitor patient’s physiological signals (such
as electrocardiogram (ECG), blood oxygen levels) and other health related information
(such as physical activity levels) in a residential setting or a mobile setting. Integrat-
ing this technology with existing 3G or 4G wireless technologies permits real-time mobile
and permanent monitoring of patients, even during their daily normal activities. In such
a heterogeneous wireless environment, we can use Ad-hoc network instead of traditional
infrastructure-based wireless networks that can reduces cost of deployment, enhances net-
work performance, increases the overall network coverage area as well as reduces the service
cost. However, secure communication with data integrity and confidentiality in this type
of network is a very challenging task due to different wireless technologies and subscription
from various service providers. In addition, instead of storing the PHI at local health-
service provider, the recent advancement of cloud computing allows us to store all personal
health information (PHI) at cloud-storage and ensures availability with reduce the capital
and operational expenditures. However, they also bear new risks and raise challenges with
respect to security and privacy aspects. Stored data confidentiality with patient-centric
access control is considered as one of the biggest challenges raised by cloud-storage used
in eHealth care system.
To address these challenges, in this thesis, we first identify unique features of the eHealth
care system with security and privacy consideration. We then propose a light weight
secure data forwarding scheme for the WBNs environment. A hybrid approach, integrated
with public and private key cryptography was adopted to ensure the effectiveness of the
scheme. Due to critical and real-time nature of the health application, WBANs also need
to provide acceptable Quality of Service(QoS) in order to provide an efficient, valuable and
fully reliable assistance to patients. Taking QoS as an evaluation metric, we study packet
scheduling schemes for realtime transmission in WBAN and classified real-time and non
real-time traffic to minimize the waiting time of eHealth application’s data traffic.
Secondly, we propose an Agent-based Secure and Trustworthy packet-forwarding Pro-
tocol (ASTP) for a cooperative mobile social network. In a cooperative mobile social net-
work environment patient equipped with WBANs forms an on-demand adhoc network and
use multi-hop routing to enhance network performance, minimize the cost of deployment,
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increase the coverage area as well as reduce the overall service cost. We use Semi-agent-
symmetric trust metric, considering neighbor nodes’ previous and recent activities and
incorporate with proper security tools that enhanced the overall performance. Renewable
pseudo-identities are used to ensure patients’ identity privacy. Security analysis and ex-
perimental results demonstrate that ASTP improves the average packet delivery ratio and
maintains the require security and privacy at the cost of an acceptable communication
delay.
Considering patients living in rural area, thirdly we introduce a delay-tolerant secure
long-term health care scheme, RuralCare, for collecting patients sensitive PHI by using
conventional transportation vehicles (e.g., cars, buses) as relay nodes. These vehicles are
expected to store, carry, and forward the PHI to the health-service-provider located mostly
at the city area following an opportunistic routing. RuralCare improves network perfor-
mance by providing incentive to the cooperative vehicles, and encompasses identity based
cryptography to ensure security and privacy of the PHI during the routing period by using
short digital signature and pseudo-identity. Network fairness and resistance to different
possible attacks are also ensured by RCare. Extensive security and performance analyses
demonstrate that RuralCare is able to achieve desired security requirements with effective-
ness in terms of high delivery ratio.
Finally, to store patients sensitive PHI at the cloud storage and ensure availability with
reducing the capital and operational expenditures, we propose a patient-centric personal
health information sharing and access control scheme (ESPAC). ESPAC relieves the health
service providers (HSP) additional burden for PHI storage, management, and maintenance
by incorporating cloud storage services to electronic Health (eHealth) care system. ESPAC
adopts attribute based encryption and assigns different attributes to PHI access requesters
based on their roles and relation to the patient. To ensure authenticated PHI access with
minimum computation, we further enhance the proposed scheme ESPAC as M-ESPAC
by introducing multi-parties proxy re-encryption protocol. Light weight partial and block
PHI audits make the M-ESPAC efficient to ensure stored PHI integrity and availability.
Extensive performance and security analyses demonstrate that proposed schemes are able
to achieve desired security requirements with acceptable computation and storage costs.
The research results of the thesis should be useful for the implementation of secure and
privacy-preserving eHealth care system with patient centric access control of stored PHIs.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 eHealth Care System and Challenges
Electronic Healthcare (eHealth) system has drawn a lot of attention from the research
community and industry to face the challenge of rapidly growing elderly population and
rapidly rising health care cost. It is defined as the application of information and commu-
nication technologies across the whole range of function that affect the patient’s Personal
Health Information (PHI), Fig.1.1 shows the data flow diagram of PHIs.
The eHealth service provisioning is an increasingly important need today as the number
of chronic illness in the industrialized countries is growing rapidly and an urgent solution for
minimizing the health services cost is needed. Various statistics reports indicate that 133
million people, or almost half of all Americans live with a chronic condition. That number is
projected to increase by more than one percent per year by 2030, resulting in an estimated
chronically ill population of 171 millions [1]. In Canada, the aging population is considered
to be a key contributor to the rising costs of healthcare [2]. This is due to the fact that over
50 per cent of an individual’s lifetime expenditures on healthcare occur after the age of 65,
and the number of individuals over the age of 65 is expected to rise extensively [2]. The
current percentage of the Canadian population over age 60 is 17 per cent; however, this
is projected to increase to 28.5 per cent by the year 2031 [3]. This portion of population
however, accounted for 42.7 per cent of the total health expenditure for Canada [2]. In [4],
it is shows that $5,170 per person has spent for health care in the year 2008 in Canada.
This amount is increasing as the percentage of the elderly people is also increasing over the
years. On the other hand, waiting time to have a house-physician and waiting time in the
clinic and hospitals is still considered as a stress from the patient’s side. All these statistics
1
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suggest that health care needs a shift toward more scalable and more affordable solutions.
Restructuring our healthcare systems towards proactive managing of wellness rather than
illness, and early detection of diseases is the answer to these problems. Introducing the
eHealth care system will lessen the economic impact due to the citizen health care and
an increased lifespan of the humans can be achieved via pervasive monitoring of health
indicators to detect diseases in early stages. Not only does it help reduce the effect of
chronic illness, it also may potentially save life.
Till now, medical monitoring requires the use of wires that connect patients with mon-
itoring devices and reduce their mobility and comfort at the same time that also hamper
the work of doctors and medical staff. Due to its numerous wires, rigid form, and adhesive
electrodes, comfort is compromised and making it cumbersome and unnatural for the user
to wear the devices continuously. In addition, these systems work as off-line and patients
need to visit the clinic to retrieve and analyze the recorded data. All of these lacking and
the increasing pressure for the health support bring the necessity of the wireless technol-
ogy to be used in the health care system. Therefore, The wireless technology in eHealth
care system will open the door of the remote home care facilities integrating with the
quality health services. Advances in wireless communications and computing technologies
have lent great forces to the migration of health care systems from current paper based to
eHealth system.
Recent technological developments in low-power integrated circuits, wireless commu-
nications and physiological sensors promote the development of tiny, lightweight, ultra-
low-power monitoring devices. A body-integrated network, so called Wireless Body Area
Network (WBAN), can be formed by integrating these devices. It is now possible to de-
ploy bio-sensors on,in, or around the patient body and allow to continuous monitoring of
physiological parameters (e.g. electrocardiogram (ECG), blood oxygen level, heart rate,
temperature, blood pressure, glucose levels etc.) with physical activities. Inexpensive radio
transceivers that integrated with different bio-sensors form the body area network, where
a PDA (Personal Digital Assistant) works as gateway or network coordinator. WBAN
has lent great forces to the migration of health care system from hospital or care-unit to
the patient’s residence and mitigates the overall health-care expenses. Integrating this
technology with the existing wireless technologies (e.g., cellular 3G, WiMax, Wi-Fi, GSM,
GPRS) forms an integrated heterogenous wireless network and permits real-time mobile
and permanent monitoring of patients, even during their daily normal activities. In the
heterogenous network, multi-hop routing reduces cost of deployment, enhances network
performance, increases the network coverage area as well as reduces the service cost [5, 6].
Routing the patient’s highly sensitive PHI over this unsecured wireless environment must
need to ensure proper security with data integrity and confidentiality.
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In addition, the eHealth care system needs to ensure the availability of PHI in electronic
form adheres to same level of privacy and disclosure policy as applicable to present day
paper-based patient-records accessible only from the physician’s office. Instead of storing
the PHI locally, the recent advancement of cloud computing allows us to store PHI at cloud-
storage and ensures availability with reduces capital and operational expenditures [7] (e.g.,
HealthVault from Microsoft, Health Cloud from google). Moving patients’ PHI into a cloud
or in a central storage offers enormous conveniences to the eHealth-care-providers, since
they don’t have to care about the complexities of direct hardware management. However,
patient’s privacy with proper access control of this available PHI is a growing concern in
the eHealth care industry due to the direct involvement to human. Traditional data access
schemes which are used to provide data confidentiality mostly depend on the system itself
to enforce authorization policies and rely on the system trusted infrastructure. These
schemes are not appropriate for eHealth care system, as cloud storage providers are not
fully trusted and patients generally want to be sure that their sensitive health information
can only be accessed by particular authorized users with identity privacy.
1.1.1 eHealth Characteristics
Depending on the location of patient, either wired or wireless technology can be used in
the eHealth care system. Indoor and outdoor applications are the two scenarios for the
proposed eHealth care system. Patient stays in hospital, long-term care center, nursing/old
home etc. in indoor scenario and patient locates at social gathering spot (mall, prayer hall
etc.), surrounding areas of health service provider or patient’s residence etc. In all possible
cases data traffic flows mostly from patient to the service provider side. Fig.1.2 shows the
possible eHealth infrastructure and Table 1.1 and 1.2 show different application scenarios
with network and security constants. Low, medium, and high are used to show security
requirements, where ‘high’ means a mandatory requirement, medium is used for optional
and good to be used, and low is not that much important.
eHealth care services are expected to use mobile ad-hoc network, delay tolerant network,
and vehicular ad-hoc network depending on patient’s location to provide cost effective
health care services.
1.1.2 Application of eHealth
The applications of eHealth aim at providing better healthcare services to patients. Inte-
grating with WBAN has shown great potential to expand the use of eHealth care system
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Figure 1.2: eHealth infrastructure
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Table 1.1: Different eHealth scenario - Indoor
Description Network type Security Re-
quirements
Patient resides in the hospital-cabin or
in incentive care unit
Wired Low
Patient in residence or in hospital cabin Wireless
(One-hop to Access Point
(AP))
medium
Patient in hospital, long term care cen-
ter, shopping mall, prayer hall
Wireless (multi-hop) High
Table 1.2: Different eHealth scenario - Outdoor
Description Network type Security Re-
quirements
Patient close to health service provider,
shoping mall, park
Mobile Ad-hoc Network
(MANET)
High
User is traveling Delay Tolerant Network
(DTN)
Vehicular ad-hoc network
(VANET), MANET
High
Users reside at rural area DTN, VANET High
from from ubiquitous health monitoring and computer assisted rehabilitation to emergency
medical response systems.
1. Continuous Monitoring: Continuous monitoring is one of the promising applications
of eHealth. People with different degrees of cognitive and physical disabilities will
be enabled to have a more independent and easy life. Elderly people don’t need to
be accompany 24/7 days. It will also ease the life of patient’s relatives and minimize
the nursing cost.
2. Global Health Support: Patient health-care-giver can access to stored patient’s PHI
though internet by proper authorization. It will provide anytime-anywhere patient
care. In the near future, people will get the boarder-less health services using the
RFID-enabled healthcard or national card [8].
3. Emergency Health Support: Body sensor used in WBAN will help to identifying
emergency situations like heart attacks or sudden falls in a few seconds, and in a
life-threatening emergency situation it will be possible to provide immediate care to
patient when the patient might be insensible.
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4. Patient care at rural area.
5. Location tracing: GPS(Global Positioning System) enabled eHealth devices will help
the care givers to locate the users.
6. Social network: Patients having same types of diseases may form a group and can
maintain a social network. They may share the health related information among
them.
7. Physicians appointment booking: The system will automatically book an appoint-
ment in advance based on the merit of the critical sensed data.
8. Family member’s health monitoring: Patient’s responsible family members can know
the latest health condition of patient using eHealth care services, despite of their
different locations.
1.2 Security and Privacy Threats
Although eHealth care system is expected to use different wireless technologies but security
and privacy are the common issues. In addition, healthcare facilities have specific security
concerns that are not found in most other environments. Maintaining an acceptable level
of security in this unique environment is extremely difficult. Furthermore, health care
organizations, dealing with such sensitive data as patients’ personal health information,
have to be extremely wary of the potential privacy and security risks of converting to
electronic information infrastructures. In general, the security threats in the eHealth care
system can be classified into following categories.
Passive Attackers
• Eavesdropping attack: An attacker listens to the transmissions between the legiti-
mate network entities. Some sensitive information such as the exchanged data or
routing information could be leaked to an attacker. This attack can be prevented by
using an end-to-end encryption; even if an attacker intercepted a packet, he can not
interpret it. In the eHealth care system, the transmitted information is the patient
PHI, which is highly privacy-sensitive to the owner. If an attacker is able to eavesdrop
the PHI during the wireless transmission, the application cannot be accepted.
• Privacy violation attack: An attacker reveals confidential information regarding the
identities and locations of the participant users. One technique to thwart this attack
is to hide the real identity by using pseudonyms instead of one permanent identity.
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Active Attackers
• Jamming attack: An attacker deliberately generates a huge amount of bogus messages
to join or interrupt the on-going communication. It may prevents the genuine patient
to do their regular communication.
• Forgery attack: An attacker can launch forgery attack, which could potentially cause
distrust problems among the legitimate network entities. Therefore, the freshness and
correctness of the transmitted message are very important to ensure that the received
message are not forged. In the eHealth care system, the forged PHI would result in the
compromising medical circumstances for patients, and the forged emergency message
would waste a huge amount of heathcare resources.
• Insider attack: Malicious insider can be able to access the stored PHIs and can be
succeed in stealing a legitimate user’s identity and impersonates another user for
malicious purposes, or sell the sensitive PHI to the third party.
• Collusion attack: Multiple attackers including the revoked untrusty user initially
conspire to find the secrets of the PHI storage server. Then they try to get a copy of
patient’s sensitive PHI. Users’ roll-based access control to the stored PHIs is required
to prevent collusion attack.
• Replay attack: An attacker monitors the traffic (passive attack) then retransmits the
message as the legitimate patient. Time-stamps with data encryption is needed to
prevent this attack.
1.3 Security and Privacy Requirements
In order to protect the eHealth applications against the threats mentioned above, the
security and privacy preservation mechanism employed in the eHealh care system must
have the following properties [9, 10].
• Authentication: It is the ability to ascertain that a thing is indeed the one that it
claims to be. Message authentication is of vital importance in eHealth care system
because it ensures that a received message is indeed sent from a legitimate and
registered patient in the networks.
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• Integrity: It is the ability to assure that the transmitted messages have not been
subject to modifications, additions, or deletions. Integrity assures that all the PHI
sent from the patients PDAs or gateway to the online PHI databases should be
unaltered.
• Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation is the ability to prevent an authorized user from
denying the existence or contents of the message sent by itself. Non-repudiation for
eHealth is a critical property because it can prevent an attacker from denying the
attacks that he/she has launched.
• Access control: It is necessary to ensure reliable and secure operations of a system.
In the eHealth care system, the legal users should have fine-grained capabilities to
access the different parts of PHI for the different purposes; any malicious user should
be revoked from the network to protect the safety of the privacy-sensitive PHI.
• Privacy: It is the ability to protect private information from an untrusted user.
Identity and location information of any individual should be protected in an eHealth
care system and the information can only be used in an emergency situation or
used by the TA for the conflict resolutions. Moreover, multiple transactions of one
individual should not be linked together by other entities except the TA.
1.4 Research Motivations and Contributions
The research in this thesis focuses on developing a suite of protocols to deal with the
challenging security and privacy-preserving issues in eHealth care systems. Specifically,
the research motivation and contribution are summarized as follows:
• First, secure data aggregation process starts from the patient side and the wearable
body sensors’ perform the initial sensing task. Generally medical sensors are im-
planted on,in or around the patient’s body and can continuously monitor patient’s
PHI. Body sensors work individually and form an ad-hoc network where a power-
adequate sensor or PDA works as gateway. Since frequently changing or charging
the batteries of the deployed sensors is a burdensome work for patients, the power
consumption of the PHI transmission is desired to be highly efficient. Meanwhile, the
output transmission power of the sensor nodes must be kept minimal for health is-
sues; adverse biological effects will be caused by wireless radio intensive radiation for
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long-term inspection. Thus, it is very promising to design a multi-hop routing proto-
col where the transmission range is required to be shorter. However, due to sensitive
data type and human social involvement, security and privacy is also a challeng-
ing issue in WBAN like other traditional wireless networks. In addition, the limited
power supply of the body sensors poses critical computation and communication con-
straints on designing a secure and privacy preserving schemes for body sensors. For
example, the computational cost and communication overhead of a traditional en-
cryption, such as public key encryption, are unaffordable to the body sensors. Many
research efforts on secure communication in WBANs [11–15] have been carried out.
The common goal of these works is to efficiently and securely assign a secret key
among deployed sensors and gate-way in a WBAN environment. In this thesis, we
review some related protocols and study the security and privacy issues in WBANs.
We find the existing works neglect user mobility, sensor’s energy and computational
power inefficiency, and reusability of sensor devices for different patients. To address
these issues, we propose a light-weight secure protocol based on hybrid cryptographic
operations and integrate session key with time-stamp to ensure reusability. We also
propose a secure infrastructure for multi-hop communication in WBANs that en-
sures secure communication with minimum energy requirement. During the work on
secure protocol design, we found that patient’s health information can be classified
into different categories and a packet priority management scheme need to be imple-
mented at the gate-way of WBAN to ensure reliable and efficient PHI aggregation.
Addressing this issue, we also propose a priority management scheme integrated with
our secure protocol that ensures QoS with adequate security and privacy.
• Second, delivering the PHI from an individual PDA or gate-way to the eHealth care
service provider is very difficult when patients do not have direct link to the Inter-
net. Even if the patient is in a cellular network coverage, due to service-cost and
continuous data forwarding requirement it is not a suitable solution for continuous
patient monitoring. Extending existing wireless network to cooperative multi-hop
wireless network can permit long-term permanent patient monitoring with low-cost.
In this cooperative environment, users can form an on-demand ad-hoc network and
use multi-hop routing to enhance network performance, minimize the cost of de-
ployment, increase the coverage area as well as reduce the overall service cost. In a
multi-hop wireless network, participant nodes act as relay nodes to forward neigh-
bor’s data packets. However, not every node is cooperative or willing to forward
others data traffic. The noncooperative node leads to degradation in the Quality of
Service (QoS) of the network by dropping data packets. Moreover, noncooperative
node may be a malicious node and fabricates the network routing information, as
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well as modifies the message that passes through it. Choosing the cooperative relay
node becomes more challenging in an environment where users have the services from
different service providers and the application has to support real-time data commu-
nication, like as remote patient monitoring. Many research works [16–20] studied the
cooperation data forwarding with incentive. In this thesis, we propose a data aggre-
gation scheme based on mutual thrust and historical behaviour with incentive, where
trusted authority (eHealth care giver) plays a vital role. In addition, data integrity
with authentication, network availability, and user privacy during the communication
is also considered as a key requirement for an uninterrupt secure PHI aggregation
scheme. The designed protocol also includes trust management, incentive and reward
provision policy, and the patient’s privacy requirements.
• Third, due to the recent growth of urbanization, people are moving from rural to
urban areas. But half of the world population still lives in the rural area. Specifically,
in USA and Canada, around 20% of the total population lives in rural area, 56% of
the population in the 27 Member States of the European Union (EU) lives in rural
areas, and 60% in China [21]. Moreover, some large metropolitan areas contain
small towns and these small towns are isolated from the central cluster. Providing
long-term health care to these areas is also challenging. To overcome this challenge,
we propose a Delay Tolerant Network (DTN) based PHI aggregation scheme, where
conventional transportation vehicles (e.g., cars, buses) act as relay nodes. These
vehicles are expected to store, carry, and forward the PHI to the health-service-
provider located mostly at the city area following an opportunistic routing. Network
fairness and resistance to different possible attacks are also ensured by the proposed
work.
• Fourth, the central trusted authority in an eHealth care system maintains a database
of aggregated PHI to ensure future availability and to provide long-term access to the
health professionals. Traditional data access schemes which are used to provide con-
fidentiality are mostly depend on the system itself to enforce authorization policies
and rely on the system trusted infrastructure. Instead of storing the PHI locally, the
recent advancement of cloud computing allows us to store all PHI at the cloud stor-
age and ensures availability with reduces the capital and operational expenditures.
However, storing the patients’ PHI at cloud-storage increases data-owners concern to
his sensitive PHI. Patient generally wants to be sure that his sensitive health infor-
mation can only be accessed by particular users and his original identity will not be
exposed in general. Health service provider needs to ensure only the legal entity will
get the stored PHI access. Patients’ consent and willingness need to be considered
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to design a PHI access role. Many research works [22–28] studied secure architecture
for cloud storage. In this thesis, we present a patient-centric access control of aggre-
gated stored PHI with minimum computation at the cloud side. We propose proxy
re-encryption, where trusted health service provider works for a registered user and
re-encrypts PHI for a specific PHI access requester. To ensure stored data correct-
ness, our scheme is further updated with an audit system. Trusted authority can
easily check the correctness of the stored data by using the propose scheme.
1.5 Outline of the Thesis
The organization of the remainder of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 review some
basic techniques and definitions of cryptographic operations. Chapter 3 presents a secure
and efficient data aggregation scheme for a WBAN that combines public and private key
cystography and ensures power-efficient secure communication among energy and storage
constant body sensors. Chapter 4 presents a secure and trustworthy PHI aggregation
scheme considering the neighbor nodes’ previous and recent activities. A cooperative packet
forwarding protocol using vehicular delay tolerant networks is presented in chapter 5.
Chapter 6 presents patient-centric access control of the aggregated PHI with auditing in a
cloud environment. Finally, conclusions and future research work are described in Chapter
7.
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Chapter 2
Technical Background
In this chapter, we briefly describe different definitions and techniques that used in this
thesis.
2.1 Pseudonym Technique for Identity Privacy
A pseudonym is a name that a person assumes for a particular purpose, which differs from
his or her original or true name. Pseudonyms have no literal meanings, and they can be
used to hide an individual’s real identity. In a network environment, pseudonyms have been
widely adopted to preserve user’s identity privacy [29]. An oﬄine trusted authority (TA) is
considered to initialize pseudonyms for users prior to the network deployment. The TA will
assign multiple pseudonyms for each individual user. These pseudonyms cannot be linked
by anyone but the TA. Each user changes their pseudonyms in the communications when
needed such that their behavior cannot be linked by the different pseudonyms. When
users consume all the pseudonyms, they can contact with the TA to update with new
pseudonyms.
To avoid the forgery attacks of pseudonyms, the TA assigns an additional secret to users
according to their pseudonyms. Only with the secret, a user can prove that the pseudonym
is legally held. The identity-based signature can be a solution. The TA generates a private
key for each pseudonym, and assigns the private key to the user. The user can always sign
on any message with the private key, and the generated signature can be verified with the
pseudonym. In this way, the forgery attacks of pseudonyms can be prevented.
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However, with pseudonyms, users may launch malicious attacks, such as sybil attacks.
To prevent the abuse of pseudonyms, the TA needs to set a trapdoor when generating the
pseudonyms such that it can trace user behavior. Generally, mapping function is used to
implement traceable pseudonyms:
• Mapping function: The TA generates k pseudonyms pidi for user ui. For each
pseudonym pidi, the TA also generates a corresponding pseudonym secret key pski
and sends the key to ui in a secure channel. Then, ui is able to use pidi in the com-
munication protocols. He can generate a signature using pski to make others confirm
that ui is the legal holder of pidi. In the meantime, the TA maintains a map from
these pseudonyms to the real identity idi of ui. When needed, others can always
report the signature to the TA who is able to track ui’s behavior.
2.2 Cryptographic Techniques
2.2.1 Bilinear Groups of Prime Order
Bilinear pairing is an important cryptographic primitive and has been widely adopted in
many positive applications in cryptography [30] [31]. Let G be a cyclic additive group
and GT be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same prime order q. We assume that the
discrete logarithm problems in both G and GT are hard. A bilinear pairing is a mapping
e : G×G→ GT which satisfies the following properties:
• Bilinear: ∀P,Q ∈ G1, ∀a, b ∈ Z∗q
e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab
• Non-Degeneracy: P 6= 0⇒ e(P, P ) 6= 1
• Symmetric:∀P,Q ∈ G1, e(P,Q) = e(Q,P ).
• Computability: e is efficiently computable.
Definition 1 (Bilinear Generator) A bilinear parameter generator Gen is a probability
algorithm that takes a security parameter as input and outputs a 5-tuple (q, P,G,GT , e),
where q is a -bit prime number, (G,+) and (GT ,×) are two groups with the same order
q, P ∈ G is a generator, and e : G×G→ GT is an admissible bilinear map.
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In the following, we define the quantitative notion of the complexity assumptions,
including Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem, Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH)
Problem, Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Problem, and Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DBDH)
Problem.
Definition 2 (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem) The Computational Diffie-
Hellman (CDH) problem in G is defined as follows: Given P, aP, bP ∈ G for unknown
a, b ∈ Z∗q, compute abP ∈ G.
Definition 3 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Problem) For a, b, c ∈ Z∗q, given P, aP, bP, cP ∈
G, decide whether c = ab ∈ Zq. The DDH problem is easy in G, since we can compute
e(aP, bP ) = e(P, P )ab and decide whether e(P, P )ab = e(P, P )c [32].
Definition 4 (BDH Parameter Generator) An algorithm Gen is called a BDH (Bilinear
Diffe-Hellman) parameter generator if Gen takes a sufficient large security parameter K >
0 as input, runs in polynomial time in K, outputs a prime number q, the description of
two groups G1 and G2 of order q, and the description of a bilinear map e : G1×G1 → G2.
Definition 5 (BDH Problem hardness) Given a random element P ∈ G1, as well as
aP ,bP ,cP , for some random a, b, c ∈ Z∗q; there is no efficient algorithm to compute e(P, P )abc ∈
G2 from P, aP, bP, cP ∈ G1. This implies the hardness of the BDH in the group G1 [30].
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Chapter 3
Energy Efficient and Secure Data
Aggregation in WBAN
3.1 Introduction
Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN) is considered as a promising technology that pro-
vides short range, low power and reliable wireless communication in a close proximity to
or inside human body. A PDA (Personal Digital Assistant) works as a gateway or network
coordinator in this network. The major uses of this technology can be classified as medical
and non-medical applications. Different bio-medical sensors are deployed on, in, or around
the patient body to measure the different health data, such as Temperature, Heart rate
monitor, Blood pressure monitor, Pulse oximeter SpO2, pH monitor, Cardiac arrhythmia
monitor/recorder, Brain liquid pressure monitor [33]. Real time video, audio streaming,
data file transfer, remote control application, real time gaming, body positioning etc. are
some non-medical applications using the WBAN technology.
The use of WBAN in eHealth, which is crucial for human life, highlights the importance
of security and privacy. Computation, memory, and communication capabilities limited
sensors need to be securely connected with the PDA. We also need to ensure confidentiality
and integrity of the user’s bio-medical sensed data. To minimize the network overhead and
maximize the network life time, sensors have to communicate themselves using a group
key. Sensors use this group key to ensure a reliable group communication in the WBAN.
Supporting the real-time application in the resource inadequate WBAN is always con-
sidered as an important issue. Different real-time and non real-time applications in WBAN
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Figure 3.1: A coexisting application scenario of WBAN with WPAN and WLAN
need different types of services and require specific analyses and accurate estimation of the
QoS levels. The emergency data packets of the eHealth applications must be served with
the required QoS level so that a pervasive and trusted assistance is provided to patients
under the different health risks. The issue becomes more critical if the network capacity is
insufficient. Other non-medical real time applications like multimedia streaming applica-
tion, gaming also need fixed bit rate and they are also delay sensitive. Proper prioritization
among these real-time applications can only guarantee a certain acceptable level of per-
formance. Among different QoS parameters, availability, confidentiality and privacy, data
delivery latency, reliability, and mobility support are considered the major requirements
of an eHealth care system [34]. In this work, we propose a secure and privacy preserving
communication including real-time traffic scheduling using WBAN. We classify the real-
time and non real-time traffic in WBAN to minimize the mean waiting time of the high
priority, delay sensitive eHealth application traffic.
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3.2 WBAN Architecture
Wireless body area network (WBAN) consists of low-power, lightweight, small-size, and
intelligent sensors that are placed on, in or around the human body ,and generally used to
monitor different humans physiological signals and motion for medical, personal entertain-
ment and other applications and purposes. Compared with traditional WLANs, WBANs
enable wireless communications in or around a human body by means sophisticated per-
vasive wireless computing devices [35]. Based on the type of application, various sensors
deployed in, on or around the body continuously or periodically monitor vital signals and
send data to nearby gateway (PDA, mobile devices or personal server). This gateway is
also called as Network Coordinator (NC).
Body Sensor
a) Star topology
b) Multi-hop relay
    topology
i) Intra-BAN Communication
PDA
Personal server
ii) Inter-BAN Communication
Internet
Gateway
Access Point
Care giver
Emergency
Cloud Storage
iii) Beyond-BAN Communication
Figure 3.2: Multilevel Architecture of WBAN
Fig. 3.2 demonstrates multi-level architecture of a WBAN. Intra-BAN communication
18
can be performed using Star or Multi-hop relay topologies. Inter-BAN communication
usually refer to radio communication of about 2 meters around the human body using
Bluetooth or Zigbee [36]. Beyond-BAN communications is designed to use in Metropolitan
Area Network (MAN) and involves on health care related applications.
3.3 Security and Privacy Requirement at WBAN
Before presenting our approach to ensure data security and user privacy for WBANs, we
first describe the security and privacy requirements for a WBAN. The term of data security
means the sensed data is securely stored and transferred, data privacy means the data can
only be accessed by authorized users, and user privacy means data owner’s identity privacy.
We categorized security and privacy requirements in a WBAN for an eHealth application
into two categories: security and privacy in communication initialization and network
communication data security.
3.3.1 Security and Privacy in Communication Initialization
Secure Management
Based on the diversity of the health application, body sensors might be owned by a spe-
cific user or might be shared by a group of authenticated users at the care giver place.
Network coordinator with help of trusted health service provider ensures proper selection
of encryption and digital signing algorithm with system parameters.
Device Initialization and Bindings
It confirms the identity of the original source node. The WBAN coordinator must need to
verify the original source of data before accepting the received data. Sensor devices need
to be bind with a specific coordinator to ensure secure communication.
3.3.2 Network Communication Data Security
Data Confidentiality
Among different data security requirements, confidentiality of patient data is considered as
one of the major requirements. It is required to protect the data from disclosure [37, 38].
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Patient’s vital health information should not be leaked to external or other WBAN network
situated in the network coverage. An adversary or attacker can eavesdrop on the commu-
nication, and can overhear the critical patient’s health information. This eavesdropping
may cause severe damage to the patient since the adversary can use the acquired data for
many illegal purposes.
Data Integrity
Keeping the data confidential by using traditional encryption does not protect it from
external modifications. An adversary can always manipulate the data within a packet by
adding additional fragments and this packet can later forwarded to the WBAN’s coor-
dinator or master node. Lack of data integrity can cause severe problem in the case of
life-critical events, where emergency data is altered by the attacker.
Data Authentication
It confirms the identity of the original source node.
Data Freshness
The adversary may sometimes capture data in transit and replay them later using the old
key in order to confuse the coordinator. Data freshness implies that the data is fresh and
that no one can replay old messages.
3.4 Related Works
Recently, trust based routing has gained much attention as an effective way to improve data
routing security. Chi et al. [39] identified the unique features of trust metrics compared
with QoS-based routing metrics. In that protocol, a systematic analysis of the relationship
between trust metrics and trust-based routing protocols was presented. A model for trust
evaluation and trust update based on fuzzy logic is described in [40]. This model is first
used to analyse the physical requirements and psychology of the malicious attackers and
then modify the corresponding nodes trust values. Cooperation between neighbour nodes
are used to find out the trust node in [16,41]. To provide fairness, an incentive mechanism
is integrated with the routing protocol in [16]. The overhead of the communication was
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reduced by using a cheating detection system. Lu et al. [42] improve the packet delivery
ratio and resist most possible attack in a vehicular delay tolerant networks by presenting
a social-based privacy preserving packet forwarding protocol. A secure multicast strategy
is proposed in [43] to allow trustworthy nodes participate in the communication. Wang
et al. [6] present a linear trust evaluation method based on self-observed information of a
certain node and other nodes.
Security and Privacy issues in eHealth care systems are addressed in [43–45]. Patient
privacy, one of the most serious concerns of patients, is fairly addressed in [44]. Xiaodong
et al. [45] proposed a privacy preserving scheme for heath care that can effectively work
against global adversary. In [46], an authentication protocol is developed. The protocol
uses “Time-stamp” to describe and verify the signature and the freshness of the message.
Decker et al. [47] present a privacy-preserving eHealth protocol based on a credential
systems. Entity authentication and item integrity are provided by verifiable public key
cryptography.
3.5 System Model and Data Processes Steps in WBAN
Consider a WBAN composed of s body sensors that have minimum computational capa-
bilities. We denote S = s0, s1, ..., sn the sensors set and s0 is denoted as the coordinator.
Each sensor is associated with a unique identifier such as MAC address or manufacture
serial number by which it can be distinguished from others. Two nodes are called neigh-
bour nodes if they are within each other communication range and there received signal
strength is stronger compare to others. Neighbor nodes in a WBAN construct a stable
backbone link for a multi-hop WBAN.
A shortest path tree rooted at the data sink n0 is constructed using stable backbone link
based on received acknowledgement signal strength. Here we would like to note that the
multi-hop communication is only applicable to WBAN where the sensor’s energy level is
less than pre-defined threshold point. Instead of using real-time next hop selection routing
protocol, we prefer to use defined next hop selection. Energy and computation inefficient
sensor does not need to perform real-time next hop selection and we can ensure long life
of the network. Fig. 3.3 shows the multi-hop communication architecture of WBAN.
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First Hop Body-Sensor
Second Hop Body-SensorCoordinator
Figure 3.3: Multi-Hop WBAN
3.5.1 Security Model
In our work, we have considered external attacks in a WBAN where adversaries outside
the network launched the attack. Inside attack in a WBAN environment is negligible as
network is formed around or close to the user. DoS attacks are out of scope of this work.
We do not consider lower-layer jamming or side-channel attacks. We used encryption and
one-way hashing function to prevent eavesdropping attacks and data modification at low
cost. Public-key cryptography usually consumes more energy to compute encrypted data,
so we used hybrid approach (Public and Private key combinations) to minimize the overall
cost.
3.6 Proposed Approach for Secure Data Aggregation
in WBAN
3.6.1 Security initialization
At the very fist initialization phase, The trusted service provider or trusted authority (TA)
will run the function Gen(S) to compute the bilinear parameters (q,G,GT , e, P ). The TA
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will then do the following steps
1. Select a random numbers α ∈ Z∗q and compute public key of a body sensor node as
PKSN = α× P ;
2. Stores the PKSN and secret keys α in the respective sensor nodes;
3. Provides an unique ID to the subscribers IDuser;
4. Generate the secure hash function H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗1
5. Distribute IDuser, PKSN , and H1 to the subscribers.
3.6.2 System Initialization by the User
The individual user will do the following steps:
1. Compute the sensors’ pseudo-identity PIDSN = H2(IDSN);H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n;
2. Select a random number β ∈R Z∗q , to calculate the session key Pβ = β × P
3. Choose a random number r ∈ Z∗q and compute the public key PKU = r × P .
3.6.3 Source Authentication
The major source and data authentication tasks are performed by the WBAN’s gateway.
But during the multi-hops communication phase, participated sensors need to perform
source authentication to confirm membership of the same network. Following steps are
followed to perform the source authentication:
• Step 1: Let the provided secret key of the gateway is s0 and the corresponding public
key is PKgw = s0P . The gateway generates the secret key of the sensor node as
SID = t× PIDSN = s0H2(IDSN).
• Step 2: Chooses an arbitrary R ∈ G and picks a random integer k ∈ Z∗q. Gateway
or PDA then computes r¯ = e(R,P )k.
• Step 3: Generatesm = MAC||KEY , where MAC is the unique Media Access Control
(MAC) address and KEY is the session key chosen by the authenticated user.
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• Step 4: Computes v = H2(m, r¯) and u = vSID + kP .
• Step 5: Sends (u, v) as signature to sensor.
After receiving the message (u, v), sensor nodes perform the following verification to
ensure source authentication.
• Step 1: At first, computes r¯ = e(u,p)
e(H2(ID),PKgw)
• Step 2: Confirm source authentication if v = H2(m, r¯) is validated.
3.6.4 Message Encryption and Decryption:
Here we present how a sensor and PDA can encrypt and decrypt a message using the
bilinear pairing cryptography. The processes will be followed at the first time of a session
to distribute a session key securely among the nodes in a WBAN. Let K is the session key
chosen by the PDA; it then compute
v = Enc(PKSN , K, PKU) = K ⊕H4(grU) (3.1)
Here gU = e(QU , PKU), QU = H3(PIDSN); H3 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗1 and H4 : G2 → {0, 1}∗ are
secure hash functions.
The encrypted key is decrypted using theDec(PKSN , v, d) function, here d = αH3(PIDSN)
and α is the secret key of the corresponding sensor.
Dec(PKU , v, d) = K (3.2)
Dec(PKU , v, d) = v ⊕H4(e(d, PKU)
= v ⊕H4(e(αH3(PIDSN)), rP )
= v ⊕H4(e(H3(PIDSN), P )rα)
= v ⊕H4(e(H3(PIDSN), αP )r)
= (K ⊕H4(grU)⊕H4(grU)) = K
Fig. 3.4 demonstrates the proposed secure the data process in a WBAN.
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Figure 3.4: Flowchart of the secure data processes in WBAN
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3.6.5 Signature and Verification
User U will sign the message v using the cryptographic digital signature (equation 3.3)
that is also based on bilinear pairing.
S = Sig(v, β, r) (3.3)
S = 1
v+β+r
P
The sensors will verify it using the equation (3.4).
e(vP + Pβ + PKU , S) = e(P, P ) (3.4)
e(vP +Pβ +PKU , S) = e((v+β+r)P, (v+β+r)
−1P ) = e(P, P )(v+β+r)(v+β+r)
−1
= e(P, P ).
The sensor only need to verify the signature during the periodic key updating pro-
cess. When the session key is securely distributed among the sensors, they will simply
use the key K to encrypt the message as Enc(K,message) or decrypt the ciphertext as
Dec(K,Enc(K,message)) to obtain the sensitive medical data.
Secure data aggregation in WBAN using multi-hop communication (Fig. 3.3) can also
be performed by the steps shown above. In this case, second and first hop sensors securely
communicate with each others using symmetric key cryptography, where session key is
used as shared key.
3.7 Performance Analysis
Compared with the symmetric key cryptography, the public key cryptography is more
expensive in terms of computation, and has been taken not suitable in sensor’s application
in the past. However, recent reports showed that the public key techniques with efficient
software and hardware design is very viable on low power sensor nodes, and a number of
subsequent studies following a public key technique have appeared in recent researches [48]
[49]. Moreover, in our proposed scheme, we have only used public-key cryptography for
key management in WBAN and rest of the time low cost symmetric key cryptography has
used.
We adopt the bilinear parameters (q,G,GT , e, P ) described in [50] with |q| = 160 bits,
|P | = 512 bits, such bilinear parameters can achieve the same security level as 1024-
bit RSA. We assume that each body sensor node is equipped with a low-power, high
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performance Intel PXA27x series processor [51]. Pairing operation is considered the most
energy-hungry operation and computational cost is much more higher than other operations
needed to implement bi-linear cryptography. It is shown that a single pairing needs about
10 times more time to compute than a scaler multiplication [52]. We denote by Ce a
computation of the pairing, and Cm a scalar multiplication in G1. According to [48] [53],
pairing operation needs around 140 ms and energy consumption is 25.5 mJ, whereas energy
consumption on the modulus multiplication operation (Cm) is 2 mJ. Time cost of used
cryptographic operations is given in table 6.1.
Table 3.1: Time and energy cost for cryptographic operations
Operation Time Energy
Encryption1 140 ms (Ce) 25.5 mJ
Decryption1 140 ms (Ce) 25.5 mJ
Signature 15 ms (Cm) 2 mJ
Verification 155 ms (Cm + Ce) 27.5 mJ
Encryption2 20 µs/byte 1.62 µJ
Decryption2 20 µs/byte 2.49 µJ
We denote data encryption and decryption using public key cryptography as functions
Encrypt1 and Decrypt1 and Symmetric key cryptography as Encrypt2 and Decrypt2. Im-
plementation of data encryption and decryption using 128 bits Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard (AES), integrated with wireless sensor (CC2420), need 1.62 and 2.49 µJ respectively,
whereas a button size 1.5V battery has 15624 J of energy [54].
We consider a WBAN deployed on the body of a person with height 1.7m. The network
is composed of n nodes, where n
2
nodes are in the first hope distance and the rest are in
the second hop distance. Considering network coordinator n0 is placed at the middle of
the body, first-hops sensors n1..3 are placed in the 25cm(d1) distance from the coordinator.
Second-hops are in placed 40cm(d2) from first-hop’s sensor. Using a simple radio model in
free space [55], we sum-up the following equations to calculate the total energy needed for
single-hop and multi-hop communications.
Esh =
n
2
ETX(l, d1) +
n
2
ETX(l, d1 + d2) + nERX(l) (3.5)
Esh =
n
2
ETX(l, d2) + nETX(l, d1) + nERX(l) (3.6)
Equation 3.5 refer to the total energy needed to transmit l-bits messages using single-
hop communication and Equation 3.6 shows the total energy needed for multi-hops com-
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munication, where n is the total number of sensors. We use the simple radio model to
calculate the energy spend at the receiver and the transmitter [55]. To transmit a l bit
message for d distance, the energy spend is
ETX(l, d) = lEelec + lEmpd
4 (3.7)
where Eelec is the energy used by the transmitter electronics and Emp is the amplifier
energy. To receive a l bit message the energy spend is
ERX(l) = lEelec (3.8)
In our simulation, we use the Table 3.1 values and system parameters values as Eelec =
50µJ and Emp = 0.13µJ [55] to calculate average energy with different number of sensors.
As the intermediate sensor nodes need to transmit additional data packets for the second-
hops node, they are going to be out of energy earlier compare to others. As shown in
Fig 3.5, multi-hops communication consumes less average energy compare to single-hop.
We then proposed an optimize solution. In the optimize approach, intermediate nodes
integrate second-hop’s data to its own data by doing some advance observation. Deployed
sensor mostly sensed a specific pattern of data and sensed data can be represented as the
difference of previous and current sensed data. Even, sensed data may not be varied in a
normal healthy condition. In this case, intermediate relay node only adds few bits with
its data packet and thus only add energy consumption for symmetric key encryption and
decryption with the single hop equation.
3.8 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyse the security properties of the proposed protocol.
3.8.1 Resilience to Packet Analysis Attack
In the proposed protocol, data aggregation at the WBAN is performed by using session
key and the dynamic session time is updateable based on the location. Without knowing
the secret session key, the adversary cannot recover the plain text by performing packet
analysis. In addition, because the pseudo identity is used instead of original identity, no
identity information will be disclosed. Therefor, the proposed protocol for WBAN can
resist the packet analysis attack.
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Figure 3.5: Average Energy Per Round
3.8.2 Resilience to Source Authentication Attack
In the initialization phase, trusted authority ensures the proper set of body sensors for
a specific user. WBAN’s gateway first matches sensor identifications with its pre-loaded
sensors set. The secret key is only share among the sensors if and only if the the sensors
pass the identification test step. In addition, sensors identity is cryptographically attached
with the message signature. Thus the intermediate node or the gateway can easily verify
the source authentication.
3.8.3 Resilience to Data Authentication Attacks
A receiver node accepts only data packets that contain valid message signature. Recall
that the session key updates frequently and attacker cannot obtain any information about
the session period by doing exhaustive packet analyzing. Any false data packet will be
rejected directly by the receiver node if attached the signature is invalid.
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3.9 Proposed scheduling scheme
In this section, we proposed a scheduling scheme for eHealth care data packets based
on different priorities. Usually the network coordinator(PDA) works in a multi-tasking
environment to support different applications run by the user (Fig. 3.6).
Figure 3.6: Traffic scheduling at PDA
In a conventional queuing packet scheduling scheme, priority is assigned to the real time
traffic and other types of traffics are marked as normal traffic. But in a WBAN different
types of real-time traffics need to be classified. In our non-preemptive queuing model, the
PDA will do the following steps:
• Check if the arrival traffic is real-time or non real-time traffic;
• Check if it is an emergency health application traffic or not;
• Classify the traffic and store them into the high and low priority queues;
• Classify the high-priority traffic based on their QoS requirements;
• Select the packet from the queue for the next servicing based on the priority and
QoS requirements. Ensure that running process will finish its task first.
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The packets stored in the high priority queue (Qh) are served at αµ, prior to the non
priority class with a service rate of µ. We use the M/G/1 queuing system to model this
multiple-queues and single server system. In our analysis, we assume the packets that are
related to high-priority queue and low-priority queue (Ql) are called class-h (Ch) and class-l
(Cl) packets with the average length of Lh and Ll, respectively. Both Ch and Cl packets
are traveling according to the Poisson process, with arrival rate of λh and λl, respectively.
The service times are generally distributed, and the sensor nodes and PDA are assumed
to be stationary.
3.9.1 High-priority queue
The average service time for a Ch packet is E[Sh] =
1
αµh
= Lh
R
. Transmission rate and
packet length are marked as R and Lh respectively. Different real-time traffic is classified
by the weighting factor α. Here, the aim is to calculate the queuing delay for each Ch packet
that is defined as the expected waiting time E[Wh]. The waiting time of Ch consists of two
components: a) remaining service time of a packet in service E[TR], and b) required time
to serve all of the packets with higher and same priorities E[Th],i.e.,
E[Wh] = E[TR] + E[Th] (3.9)
A packet of Ch is in service with probability ρh = λhE[Sh], which is the utilization of
Class-h packets. As the arrival time is randomly selected and the class (either Ch or Cl)
that is already being served is unknown, the expected remaining time is
E[TR] = ρh
E[S2h]
2E[Sh]
+ ρl
E[S2l ]
2E[Sl]
(3.10)
Using the Little’s law, the second term of the equation 3.9 can be written as
E[Th] =
λhE[Wh]
αµh
= ρhE[Wh] (3.11)
Substituting the value of E[TR] and E[Th] into equation 3.9, E[Wh] can be calculated as
follows
E[Wh] =
ρh
E[S2h]
2E[Sh]
+ ρl
E[S2l ]
2E[Sl]
1− ρh (3.12)
The second moment of service requirement of a Ch packet can be expressed as follows:
E[S2h] = V ar[Sh] + (E[Sh])
2 (3.13)
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In our approach, the PDA has a fixed service time to serve its packets, hence the service
time is deterministic with zero variance (V ar[Sh] = 0). Thus equation 3.13 can be re-
written as E[S2h] = (E[Sh])
2 = (Lh
R
)2. Finally from equation 3.12, the mean waiting time
of the Qh can be expressed as
E[Wh] =
ρh
Lh
2Rh
+ ρl
Lh
2Rh
1− ρh (3.14)
3.9.2 Low-Priority queue
The expected waiting time for the low-priority queue (Ql) is depends on the expected
service time seen by an arriving packet of Cl type in Qh and Ql. This waiting time can be
written as
E[Wl] = E[Y1] + E[Y2] + E[Y3] + .... (3.15)
Here E[Y1] is the expected service time seen by the Cl packet at its arriving in Qh and
Ql and the time needed to finish the service that already in process. Thus, E[Y1] can be
expressed as:
E[Y1] = E[TR] + E[T ] (3.16)
E[TR] is considered as the remaining time of the packet that already in the service and
E[T ] is the time needed to serve all of the packets of the high priority queue and equal
priority. Using the PASTA property, E[T ] can be calculated as:
E[T ] =
E[Nh]
αµh
+
E[Nl]
µl
= ρhE[Wh] + ρlE[Wl] (3.17)
Here Nh and Nl are the packets waiting in Qh and Ql to be served. From the equation
3.10 and 3.13, we can derive E[TR] = ρh
Lh
2R
+ ρl
Ll
2R
. Substituting the values of E[TR] and
E[T ] into equation 3.16, we have
E[Y1] = ρh
Lh
2R
+ ρl
Ll
2R
+ ρ1E[Wh] + ρlE[Wl] (3.18)
Similarly, E[Y2] is the expected service time associated with higher priority packets during
the E[Y1] is processing, E[Y3] is the expected service time associated with the higher priority
packets during the E[Y2] is processing, and so on. Hence the expected waiting time can be
written as
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E[Wl] = (E[Y1] + E[Sh]ChE[Y1] + E[Sh]ChE[Y2] + .....)
= E[Y1] +
Ch
αµh
(E[Y1] + E[Y2] + ...)
= E[Y1] +
Ch
αµh
E[Wl]
(3.19)
The term Ch
αµh
E[Wl] can be written as ρhE[Wl]. Substituting the value of E[Y1] into
equation 3.19, we can simplify the mean waiting time of the low-priority queue as:
E[Wl] =
ρh
Lh
2R
+ ρl
Ll
2R
+ ρhE[Wh]
1− ρh − ρl (3.20)
3.10 Performance Evaluation of Scheduling Approach
In order to evaluate the performance of the scheduling algorithm, we perform the simulation
considering Lh=Ll=64 bytes and Rh=Rl=350 kbps.
Fig. 3.7 shows the mean waiting time of the high and low priority traffic having
λh = λl = λ. We classifies the real-time traffic based on their service time and security
requirements. Delay sensitive and security require traffic (for health care) is classified as
case 1 and we assume α = 1 for this pattern of traffic. Other real-time traffic such as video
or on line gaming traffic are classified as case 2 with α = 1.5. Other type of packets are
marked as case 3 with α = 2. Traffic is either high priority or low priority based on their
QoS bindings. It is shown in Figure 3.7 that the short real time traffic needs less waiting
time and hence can be improved the overall performance.
We then differ the arrival rates of the high and low priority traffic as case 1 (λh = 0.5λl),
case 2 (λh = λl), and case 3 (λh = 2λl). Fig. 3.8 shows the mean waiting time with
different packet arrival rates. The mean waiting time of low priority traffic for case 1
increases significantly at λ = 0.8 (Fig. 3.8). Sub-figure in Fig.3.8 shows that the waiting
time rapidly increase to more then 100 ms when we choose λh = 3λl for the low priority
traffic of case 1 but the high priority traffic of same case has a steady response.
3.11 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a hybrid secure data aggregation scheme for WBANs. The
protocol uses periodic session key as the secret key. User’s privacy is maintained by using
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Figure 3.7: Mean waiting time with variable weighting factor
pseudo-identity in all stage of the communication. Our proposed secure communication
scheme can minimize the key storage space and need less computation. A priority based
traffic scheduling scheme for real-time application in WBAN is proposed and analyzed.
Proposed traffic classification scheme ensures the QoS of real-time application by minimiz-
ing the mean waiting time. Security analysis and simulation results show that the WBAN’s
QoS bindings for the eHealth application can be achieved by using our proposed scheme.
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Figure 3.8: Mean waiting time with different arrival rate
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Chapter 4
ASTP: Cooperative Trust Aware
Data Aggregation in Urban Area
4.1 Introduction
Electronic health care is becoming a vital part of our daily life and exhibits advantages
over the paper-based legacy system. The eHealth service provisioning is an increasingly
important requirement as the elder population in the industrialized countries is growing
rapidly and an urgent solution for minimizing the health services cost is needed. Advances
in wireless communications and computing technologies have lent credence in the migration
of health care systems from paper based to electronic system. Recent advances in Wire-
less Body Area Networks (WBANs) have made it possible to deploy bio-sensors on, in, or
around the patient body and allow to continuous monitoring of physiological parameters
(e.g., electrocardiogram (ECG), blood oxygen levels etc.) with physical activities. Coexist-
ing and cooperating with other wireless and wired technologies, WBANs permit real-time
mobile and permanent monitoring of patients, even during their daily activities. In these
cooperative environment, users can form an on-demand adhoc network and use multi-hop
routing to enhance network performance, minimize the cost of deployment, increase the
coverage area as well as reduce the overall service cost.
In a multi-hop wireless network, participant nodes act as relay nodes to forward neigh-
bor’s data packets. However, not every node is cooperative or willing to forward others data
traffic. The noncooperative node leads to degradation in the Quality of Service (QoS) of
the network by dropping data packets. Moreover, noncooperative node may be a malicious
node and fabricates the network routing information, as well as modifies the message that
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passes through it. Choosing the cooperative relay node becomes more challenging in an
environment where users have the services from different service providers and the applica-
tion has to support real-time data communication (e.g., eHealth application). In addition,
data integrity with authentication, network availability, and user privacy are considered as
key requirements for an uninterrupt-secure health monitoring system.
To provide the above mentioned system requirements in a heterogenous wireless envi-
ronment, this paper presents ASTP using bi-linear pairing. Trust factor used in ASTP is
semi-agent-symmetric instead of user-symmetric: If “user A trusts another user B”, it does
not mean that “user B trusts A” but “user B partially add the trust value of user A that
is provided by B’s service provider (Agent)”. Trust value used in this article to choose the
next hop relay node also depends on the node recent activities and its energy level. The
implementable security module can be integrated to the gateway of WBANs by simply
uploading the proposed security package. The service provider (named as Agent) in this
article, will provide the proper incentive to the routing nodes based on their activities and
ensure the network availability by minimizing the risk of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, the related work
is briefly discussed. Section 3 presents the security requirements and the system model.
The proposed ASTP is introduced in Section 4. The performance analysis of the ASTP is
discussed in Section 5. Section 6 analysis the security features followed by conclusion in
Section 7.
4.2 Related Work
Recently, trust-based routing has gained much attention as an effective way to choose
cooperative relay nodes. Chi et al., [39] identified the unique features of trust metrics
compared with QoS-based routing metrics. In that protocol, a systematic analysis of
the relationship between trust metrics and trust-based routing protocols is presented. A
model for trust evaluation and trust update based on fuzzy logic is described in [40]. This
model is first used to analyze the physical requirements and psychology of the malicious
attackers and then modifies the corresponding nodes trust value. Cooperation between
neighbor nodes are used to find out the trust node in [16, 41]. To provide fairness, an
incentive mechanism is integrated with the routing protocol in [16]. The overhead of
the communication was reduced by using a cheating detection system. Lu et al., [42]
have improved the packet delivery ratio and resisted most possible attacks in a vehicular
delay tolerant networks by presenting a social-based privacy preserving packet forwarding
protocol. A secure multi-cast strategy is proposed in [43] to allow trustworthy nodes
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participate in the communication. Wang et al. [6] present a linear trust evaluation method
based on self-observed information of a certain node and other nodes.
Security and Privacy issues in eHealth care systems have been addressed in [43, 45].
Xiaodong et al. [45] proposed a privacy preserving scheme for heath care that can effectively
works against global adversary. In [46], an authentication protocol is developed. The
protocol uses “Time-stamp” to describe and verify the signature and the freshness of
the message. This time variant parameters may be used in authentication protocols to
prevent replay and interleaving attacks, and to provide uniqueness of digital certificates
with resistibility to certain chosen-text attacks. Decker et al. [47] have proposed a privacy-
preserving eHealth protocol based on a credential systems. Entity authentication and item
integrity are provided by verifiable public key cryptography.
4.3 Security Requirement and System Model
4.3.1 Security Requirements
We aim at achieving the following security objectives.
• Message integrity and source authentication: All accepted messages should
be delivered unaltered, and the origin of the messages should be authenticated by
the recipients. An intermediate node should not be able to substitute a false message
for a legitimate one.
• Confidentiality: Confidentiality protects data from non-authorized users during
data communication. The proposed architecture has to prevent disclosure of patient’s
health information without appropriate authorization.
• Prevention of Ciphertext-only attack: The system should be secured enough
to prevent recover of the plaintext from a set of stored ciphertexts.
• Privacy Concerns: Privacy is one of the important concern from a patient’s
perspective. Illegal disclosure and improper use of patient’s health records can cause
legal disputes and undesirable damaging in patient’s personal life.
• Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation prevents either sender or receiver from denying
a transmitted message. As the intermediate routing nodes will get some incentive,
message non-repudiation must be ensured.
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• Secure Routing: In a multi-hop communication scenario, secure routing is required
for the sensitive patient health information.
4.3.2 System Model
In our system model, we consider that an eHealth user (eU) subscribes health-service from
an authorized service provider, identified as Agent (eAg). The Central eHealth Control
Authority (CCA) authorizes the Agent (e.g., Hospital, Urgent clinic, Home care unit etc.)
to provide secure and reliable health services to the citizen. We classify the In-door com-
munication as users located in the hospital, long term care center, in-home, shopping mall,
community center, church/ prayer hall, and need single, or multi hop communication to
communicate through network Access Point (AP). On the other side, Out-door scenario
includes user mobility around the hospital, malls, parks, or in the public transits where
multi-hop communication is chosen most of the time. Between patient and Agent, data
packets are routed through different wireless technologies, likely WiFi, WiMax or UMTS.
All these network technologies have their own authentication and security mechanisms. But
for a real time application (e.g., eHealth), a generalized secure communication architecture
is required despite of different network technologies. Taking this into account, the ASTP
proposes a unique secure and trust-based packet routing protocol. The proposed protocol
aims to solve the issue of secure routing with proper privacy during the communication
from user to the corresponding Agent. Secure communication in WBANs is discussed in
our previous work [56]. Fig. 6.1 shows the typical eHealth scenarios where data packet is
routed on a secure and trusty path (shown in arrowed line).
4.4 The Proposed ASTP Protocol
In this section, we discuss the proposed ASTP protocol in two phases; system initialization
with security features is described in first phase and routing establishment based on trust
is illustrated in second phase. Notice that ‘node’ and ‘user’ are used interchangeably.
4.4.1 System initialization
The security of the proposed system depends on a computational problem related to the
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP). The pairing implementation and timing analysis
is derived in [30,57].
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Figure 4.1: System model of the ASTP
System Initialization by CCA
Given the security parameter S, the bilinear parameters (q,G,GT , e, P ) are generated
by the function Gen(S). The trusted authority CCA will do the following initializa-
tions: selects random numbers α1...αn ∈r Z∗q and computes the public key for the Agents
PKeAGi..n = α1....αnP (needed for the communication between CCA and Agent); generates
the hash function H1; securely delivers PKeAG and H1 to eAG and stores α as a secured
key for the corresponding Agent.
System Initialization by Agent (eAG) and User (eU)
The Agent first calculates the public key (PKeAg = H1(IDeAG)) by hashing its original
identity for message encryption and decryption. It then generates two hash functions,
H3 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗1 andH4 : G2 → {0, 1}∗, and computes the user’s pseudo-identity (eUPID),
eUPID = H2{eU ID}; where H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n. It then distributes eUPID, H3 and
H4 to its subscribers. On the other side, user eU calculates the public key PKeU = r×P ,
where r ∈R Z∗q is a random number. It then selects a random number β ∈R Z∗q to calculate
the next session key Pβ = β × P .
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Message Encryption and Decryption
In this subsection, we show how an user will encrypt the message ‘m’ (Eq.4.1) and decrypt
the encrypted message by the corresponding agent (Eq. 4.2). The sender encrypts the
message, m, using the public key of the corresponding receiver using the identity based
encryption [30].
v = Enc(PKeAG,m, PKeU) = m⊕H4(greU) (4.1)
Here QeU = H3(eU PID); H3 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗1, a random oracle; geU = e(QeU , PKeAG).
and H4 : G2 → {0, 1}∗, a random oracle. The encrypted message is decrypted using
the Dec(PKeU , v, d) function, here d = αH3(eU PID) and α is the secret key of the
corresponding agent.
Dec(PKeU , v, d) = m (4.2)
Dec(PKeU , v, d) = v ⊕H4(e(d, PKeU) = v ⊕H4(e(α
H3(eU PID)), rP ) = v ⊕H4(e(H3(eU PID), P )rα)
= v ⊕H4(e(H3(eUP ID), αP )r) = (m⊕H4(greU)⊕H4(greU)) = m
Signature and Verification
ASTP uses cryptographic digital signature (Eq.(4.3)), based on the bilinear pairing to
provide data integrity. The intermediate routing nodes, as well as the end destination
Agent use it and verify that the encrypted message (v) is originated from the specific user
and was not altered after signing it. The user first creates session key (Pβ = βP ) and
signed the message as
S = Sig(v, Pβ, T, PKUPDA) =
1
v + β + r + T
P (4.3)
Here, T is the routing-token that composed of intermediated routing nodes’ hashed value,
details illustrate in the ‘Routing Establishment Phase’. The agent, and intermediate rout-
ing nodes then verify the signature by using the eq. 4.4.
e(vP + Pβ + PKUPDA + TP, S) = e(P, P ) (4.4)
e(vP+Pβ+PKUPDA+TP, S) = e((v+β+r+T )P, (v+β+r+T )
−1P ) = e(P, P )(v+β+r+T )(v+β+r+T )
−1
= e(P, P )
4.4.2 Routing Establishment Phase:
ASTP establishes routing path between nodes based on their mutual trust values. The
next sub-section describes the proposed trusty neighbor node selection algorithm.
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Trusty Neighbor Node Selection
ASTP evaluates neighboring nodes recent activities, trustworthiness to the agent, and
Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) to calculate the individual node’s trust value.
There are different approaches in literature to calculate the trust values, e.g. additive
increase and multiplicative decrease, linear trust evaluation, exponential and logarithm
based trust analysis [6] [43].
Exponential functions growth rate is proportional to their value. An exponential func-
tion y = ax (a > 1) has a slow increase shape when ‘x’ is not a large number (x < 1), and
‘y’ will increase slowly with the increase of ‘x’. This exponential function is suitable for
measuring node with significant non-cooperative behavior. On the other hand, logarithm
functions, f(x) = loga x, have a fast increase shape when compared to the exponential
functions [43]. This behavior allows us to use logarithm function for cooperative behavior.
Algorithm 1 Routing node selection based on trust value
Require: Source SK,PK,Encrypted message (Em),Signature, Required trust value(TrR)
1: Broadcast the periodic Routing Request Message (RRM) with TrR
2: while Routing Request (RR) 6= FALSE do
3: if Neighbor nodes response with their Trust Value(NTv) then
4: if TrR < NTv then
5: Recalculate TrR or canceled communication due to lack of trusty neighbors
6: else
7: Trv ←
(
1− 1
NTv+1
)
8: Calculate the trust factor τ = κT ime × (ra+RSSI + AS + Trv)
9: if rt > 0.5 then
10: Tr ← Λ (logτ (τ + 2× rt))
11: end if
12: if rt = 0.5 then
13: Tr ← Λ×rt×τ
14: end if
15: if rt < 0.5 then
16: Tr ← Λ× (0.5 + rt)τ
17: end if
18: end if
19: end if
20: Forward the packet to the RN1
21: end while
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At the beginning of a communication session, a user first calculates the recent trust
(0 ≤ rt ≤ 1) value of its neighbors. Other parameters we have esteemed to calculate the
trust factor are recent activities (ra), received signal strength (0 < RSSI < 1), residential
time (Time), and priority to the same Agent’s subscribers (AS = 1 for same agent’s
subscribers, 0.7 for trusted, 0.5 for semi-trusted, and 0 for none). A neighboring node is
only allowed to route the packet, when its trust value is greater than the require trust value
set by the source node. The pseudo code to choose the next secure and trusted neighbor is
given in Algorithm 1. Scaling factors κ and Λ are used to keep the calculated trust value
in the range of 0 to 1.
Example: Let node B successfully forwards 10 packets (ra = 10) of node A in the
past 5 unit of time (Time = 5). Scaling factor κ = 0.7 and Λ = 0.5. At the beginning of
the communication, node B responses with a trust value NTv = 0.7 and rt is set as 0.3.
Suppose RSSI and AS have the value of 0.5 each. Calculating the trust factor τ (equation
shown in the line no. 8 of Algorithm 1), we have the value of 1.915. Now for rt = 0.3,
the new trust value Tr will be 0.33. Suppose rt=0.6, Now the new trust value will be
Tr ← Λ (logτ (τ + 2× rt)) = 0.87.
Routing Steps
The source node first initiates route establishment phase by broadcasting Route Request
(RREQ) that contains it pseudo-identity (eUPID), required trust value (TrR), time stamp,
and the corresponding agent identity. Neighbor node replies with acknowledgement having
its pseudo-identity and willingness (as trust value NTv). Source node then chooses the next
hop based on the Algorithm1. The process continues until there is a trusty-secure commu-
nication link to Agent. At the end of route establishment phase, the Agent calculates the
routing token T = H2 (eUPID||eU1PID ||....||eUnPID ||Time− Stamp) using all intermediate
relay nodes pseudo-identity and time-stamp and replies acknowledgement (ACK) with en-
crypted ‘T’ (using Eq. 4.1). The sender then encrypts the message (Eq.4.1) and forwards
to the next hop along with message signature (Eq.4.3), public cryptographic information,
and session identity. Intermediate routing nodes verify and forward the data packet as
shown in System initialization section (Eq.4.4). After successful transmission, the agent
first checks the time bindings, decrypts the message (Eq.4.2), and ensures proper incen-
tive to the intermediate routing nodes based on their trusted performances. Finally send
acknowledgment to the user, shown in Fig. 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Routing steps of the proposed ASTP protocol
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4.5 Performance Evaluation
We conduct a probabilistic model to analyze the relation among the number of users (n),
intermediate node’s successful verification probability (p), and the trust probability (PTr)
which indicates the existence of at least a trusty neighbor node that relays the data packet.
10(n), 85%(p), 99%(PTr)
35(n), 50%(p), 99%(PTr)
80(n), 20%(p), 99%(PTr)
Figure 4.3: Relation among PTr, p, and n
Let Ai be the event that there are i trusty nodes, and n− i be the number of non-trusty
nodes in the communication range of the user U1, who belongs to the Agent Agent1. Let Tr
be the event that there are at least a trusty relay node that will verify the message and relay
to the next-hop node. Using the equation of total probability, the relation among Pr{Tr}, n,
and p can be represented as: Pr{Tr} =
n∑
i=0
Pr{Tr|Ai}.P r{Ai} = 1+(1−p)n−2(1− p
2
)n.
Here, (1 − p)i is the probability that none of the i users of the Agent1 will verify the
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message sent by U1, (1 − (1 − p)i) is the probability that there is at least one user from
the Agent1 will verify the message, and (1 − (1 − p)n−i) is the probability that there will
be at least one neighbor user from other agent will verify the message. Hence, Pr{Ai} =(
n
i
)
(1/2)i(1 − 1
2
)n−i and Pr{Tr|Ai} = (1 − (1 − p)i)(1 − (1 − p)n−i); each user position is
independent and follows binomial distribution. Fig.5.3 shows the relation among PTr, p,
and n. It can be seen that PTr increases as either p or n increases. Fixing the probability
to have at least one trusty relay node PTr to 99%, we have to ensure either large number
of users or higher verification probability.
We also conduct simulation using NS 2.33 considering a) In-door, and b) Out-door
scenarios. In our simulation, we modify the existing Adhoc On-Demand Distance Vector
(AODV) routing protocol to implement the ASTP and compare the results with the existing
AODV protocol. 50ms is considered as the computation time for the pairing on a super-
singular curve proposed in [57]. In our simulation, we randomly deploy nodes in square
areas of 350m× 350m and 850m× 850m for in-door and out-door scenarios, respectively.
Taking communication interference into consideration, we choose transmission range of
each in-door node as 70m. Nodes deploy in the out-door will probably maintain more Line-
of-Sight communication and we select 200m as the communication range for the outdoor’s
node (shown in TABLE 4.1). Other parameters are selected as the example shown in the
‘Trusty Neighbor Node Selection’ subsection.
Table 4.1: Simulation Parameters
In-door Out-door
Area 350m× 350m 850m× 850m
Number of Nodes 20 30&40
Communication range 70m 200m
Simulation time 5h 5h
Mobility 20% nodes 70% node
at 2Km/hr at 2− 50Km/hr
Packet type CBR CBR
Packet size 512 bytes 512 bytes
As our main focus is to improve packet deliver rate over an insecure wireless environ-
ment, we mainly estimate the performance based on the average packet delivery ratio and
corresponding delivery delay.
Figures 4.4 shows the average packet delivery ratio for the in-door (ID) and out-door
(OD) scenarios. Here ‘LTP’ means low trusty nodes detected prior to the communication
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Figure 4.4: Average Packet Delivery Ratio
(choose rt < 0.5), ‘LTC’ means node becomes low trusty any time during the commu-
nication, simulation results using AODV are labeled as ‘ID’ or ‘OD’, and ‘ID ASTP or
OD ASTP’ is used to label the ASTP protocol. We choose 20 nodes for the in-door sce-
nario and for the out-door scenario 30 and 40 nodes. Choosing trusted relay nodes with
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Figure 4.5: Average Packet Delivery Delay (in ms)
proper incentive strategy improves the packet delivery ratios because cooperative relay
nodes always try to forward data packets in absence of system failure. Around 26% im-
provement on the packet delivery ratio is achieved using the proposed ASTP for the indoor
scenario. It becomes 63% when we consider out-door scenario with 20% LTC.
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Fig. 4.5 shows the average packet delivery delay using AODV and ASTP. Due to
computation overhead, average packet delivery delay using the ASTP protocol is larger
than the existing AODV protocol. However, simulation results show that increase the
number of nodes significantly decreases the average packet delivery delay (around 200
ms for 10%LTP ) in the out-door scenario because it increases the probability to have
more trusted cooperative nodes as neighbors and establishes trusted routing path between
source and destination. Analyzing simulation results demonstrate that ASTP increases the
average packet delivery ratio significantly at the cost of a reasonable packet delivery delay.
4.6 Security Analysis
The proposed ASTP utilizes users’ pseudo identities instead of users’ original identities,
and these pseudo identities are generated by a strong one-way hash function (H2). The con-
struction of the hash function is easy to sample and compute but hard to invert. Therefore,
the user-privacy is ensured by the ASTP. As the trusty Agent knows the original-identity
related to the pseudo-identity, it can always retrieve the real identities of the user and en-
sure system traceability. The end-to-end data transmission uses proper encryption schemes
based on the bilinear pairing. The protocol is secure to chosen ciphertext-only attack due
to the hardness of the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem [30]. It is proven that that
there is no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that can decrypt the message from a set
of chosen ciphertext. ASTP ensures message confidentiality by transmitting the message
in the encrypted form. Since ASTP uses an efficient digital signature scheme, only the
authorized users have the privilege to access the network and proper authentication with
message integrity is preserved. A time-stamp is embedded into the routing token (T ), it
prevents the reply attack. ASTP chooses only the trusty nodes as relay nodes and the
Agent assists to ensure secure routing by always monitoring users activities and upgrading
the trust values. In the route setup phase, the corresponding Agent sends a signed ac-
knowledgement (ACK) packet, so that the sender can identifies the genuine routing path.
It prevent the malicious users to create a black-hole attack by creating a forged route table.
An attacker can form a wormhole attack by reeving a packet at one location and tunnels
them to another location in the network, and from there the packet are resent into the net-
work. The short session life-time that ensures by the time-stamp, and encrypted routing
token use in the ASTP scheme prevents this attack by verification failure and making the
packet invalid after a certain time. The relay nodes will feel encourage to forward the data
packet because of the incentive provided by the Agent for the cooperative behavior. It will
also minimize the probability of denial-of-service (DoS) attack and enhance the system
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performance.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a secure packet forwarding protocol based on mutual
trust, that integrates with trustworthiness to Agent, energy level, residential time, and
priority to the same Agent’s subscriber in a cooperative heterogeneous network. The
ASTP protocol can remarkably increase the average packet delivery ratio and achieve
excellent efficiency to be used in an eHealth application. Power efficiency at the user level
is maintained by computing major calculation at the Agent side. User privacy, an essential
part of the eHealth application, is ensured using pseudo identity. Fairness is achieved
by providing incentive to the cooperative intermediate routing nodes. Through detailed
security analyses, it has been demonstrated that the ASTP is highly effective to resist
various possible attacks and malicious behavior.
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Chapter 5
RuralCare: Incentive Based Secure
Data Aggregation in Rural Area
5.1 Introduction
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the world’s 65-and-older population is projected to
triple by 2050; it was 516 million in 2009, projected to be 761 million in 2025, and 1.53
billion in 2050 [21]. This aging population mostly suffers from chronic illness, such as heart
diseases, stroke, cancer, diabetes, hypertension, and makes the task of rural health care
more challenging. These chronic diseases require long-term monitoring, accurate disease-
management, lifestyle changes, and medication screening. Various statistics reports indi-
cate that 133 million people or almost half of all Americans live with a chronic condition.
That number is projected to increase by more than one percent per year by 2030, resulting
in an estimated chronically ill population of 171 millions [1].
Part of this elderly population or chronic patients living in urban area typically receive
better health care comparing to that of rural area due to the lack of care givers and
infrastructures. It is true that recent growth of urbanization has people moving from rural
to urban areas, but half of the world population still lives in the rural area. Specifically,
in USA and Canada, around 20% of the total population lives in rural area, 56% of the
population in the 27 Member States of the European Union (EU) lives in rural areas, and
60% in China [21]. Moreover, some large metropolitan areas contain small towns and these
small towns are isolated from the central cluster. Providing long-term health care to these
areas is also challenging.
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Chronic patients live in the rural areas need to be monitored by health professionals
regularly and need to be in touched with the care-givers to have an acceptable health status.
Providing health care at rural areas faces many barriers, such as lacking of communication
infrastructure, travel costs, lacking of health knowledge and care givers and all these prevent
deprived residence from seeking acceptable health care with ease and flexibility. Recent
advances in Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs) have made it possible to deploy
bio-sensors on, in, or around the patient lives at the rural area and allow to provide long-
term monitoring of physiological parameters (e.g., electrocardiogram (ECG), blood oxygen
levels) with physical activities. However, technological solution is needed to transfer these
aggregated sensed data from the patient residence to the care giver’s end.
Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) is an emerging network paradigm, which is considered
as a potential low-cost solution to the problem of connecting devices in an rural area
where end-to-end network connectivity is not available. In DTNs, intermittent nodes use
opportunistic connectivity (e.g., a new node moves in communication range or an existing
one wakes up) to provide data communication. In this paper, we address the problem of
transferring sensed data from patient end to care-giver’s end by integrating WBANs with
Vehicular Adhoc Networks (VNETS). Authorized Vehicles equipped with On Board Units
(OBUs) cooperate as relay nodes and could be used to provide network access for long-
term health care application in the rural area. However, selfish nodes in DTNs do not relay
other data packets but use honest nodes to relay their own packets. It degrades the network
performance, and effects network fairness, as well as security. One of the promising ways to
address this issue and stimulate cooperation among selfish nodes in DTNs is the incentive
scheme [58]. Although the proposed scheme does not provide the solution of emergency
care at the rural area but continuous monitoring with acceptable delay is helpful to set up
a proactive health care system where patient life can be saved by some precaution.
In this work, we propose an incentive based delay tolerant long-term health care scheme,
RuralCare, which is capable of monitoring patient’s health status in a rural area. It uses
WBAN, WiFi, and VANETs technologies to provide secure and fair data communication
with provision of incentive and good reputation to the cooperative relay nodes. Due to the
disconnected nature of DTNs, traditional security schemes are not applicable to RCare.
To address this problem, our solution exploits Identity Based Cryptography (IBC) [30] by
using aggregate digital signature that ensures proper incentive to all cooperative nodes, as
well as ensure data integrity.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. A brief description of related
works is described in Section 2 .Section 3 contains system model and design goals with
different security and privacy requirements. The proposed RuralCare scheme is introduced
in Section 4. Section 5 analyzes the different security and privacy features followed by
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performance evaluation in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 draws our conclusions.
5.2 Related Works
Remote patient monitoring provides additional benefits to both patients and medical per-
sonnel. The design principle and authentication processes of a remote health care system
are described in [46]. Remote health care architecture with patient-centric access control is
proposed in [59]. A heterogeneous wireless access-based remote patient monitoring system
is presented in [60]. Lin et al. [61] proposed a privacy preserving scheme for health care
that can effectively works against global adversary. Masi et al. [62], propose a feasible and
effective communication protocol for exchanging patient healthcare information among dis-
connected clinics and hospitals. By using Telehealth Doorenbos et al. [63] enhance access
to professional health education for rural healthcare providers. It can inform and educate
rural health-care providers about changes in medicine and evidence-based practices, both
os which may help them provide quality care. Secure data communication in a WBAN is
discussed in [56], where public and symmetric key cryptography techniques are used for
secure key management and data encryption, respectively. Prediction based secure and
reliable data forwarding in WBAN is introduced in [64]. This work’s major contribution
is to resist data injection attack during data communication in a WBAN.
Recently, several related works on incentive mechanisms for different kinds of networks
appeared in [16], [58], [65], [66] and [67]. In [16], Mahmoud et al., propose a light-weight
secure cooperative incentive protocol that uses combination of public-key and hashing
operations. They use Merkel hash tree to bundle the packets. In [67], a practical incentive
protocol for DTNs is proposed. Here, source node attaches some incentive with a group
of messages. With the fair incentive, the selfish DTNs nodes could be stimulated and
it increases packet delivery ratio. In our work, we modified this incentive policy and
provide security and privacy with network fairness. A simple, robust and practical incentive
mechanism for DTNs is proposed in [68] using pair-wise-tit-for-tat. Extensive simulation
results are given to show that the incentive mechanism can increase total delivered traffic
in the whole DTNs network.
Lu et al. in [58] define the fairness principle for a reputation based ad hoc network. For
the Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs), an event-based reputation model is proposed
in [65] to filter bogus warning messages. Based on the location of the vehicles, the model
classifies incoming traffic into different roles. Event reputation value is calculated in con-
sidering the different roles. Considering the global security, individual privacy, and easy
deployment in an VANETs environment, Lei et al. present as aggregate privacy-preserving
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authentication protocol (APPA) in [69]. Their work aggregates multi-signatures into a
single verifiable signature. Individual privacy is ensured by using public pseudo-identity
that can be only traced by trusted authority.
5.3 Models and Design Goals
In this section, we formalize the system model and identify the design goal.
5.3.1 System Model
In our model, we consider patients or users are located in a rural area where network
infrastructure is not available and they need long-term monitoring due to chorionic diseases.
The model is also applicable at the urban area to minimize the overall service cost, where
users are located at their own residence, old-home or care center. Fig.5.1 illustrates the
architecture of the system model, which consists of four interactive components:
• Trust Authority (TA): It generates the public security parameters for RuralCare
scheme. TA is fully trusted by the all participants in the proposed scheme and
in-charge of the users and vehicles registration. It is also connected to the RSU
backbone network. TA is responsible for providing proper incentive or reputation to
the cooperative users or vehicles. Authorized health service providers (e.g., Hospital,
urgent care) may work as TA. TA is assumed powered with sufficient computing and
storage capabilities and infeasible for any adversary to compromise.
• Patients: They are the registered users and equipped with bio-sensors on, in, or
around their bodies. Sensors deploy in a body form a Wireless Body Area Networks
(WBANs), where PDA, or efficient-sensor works as a gateway. Patient is responsible
to share a secret key among the body sensors.
• Road-Side Units (RSUs): RSUs are fixed units that can be deployed at road inter-
sections or any area of interest (e.g., bus stations, parking lot entrances, shopping
center etc.). A typical RSU also functions as a wireless access point which provides
wireless access to users within its coverage. RSUs are interconnected (e.g., by a dedi-
cated network or through the Internet via cheap ADSL connections) and form a RSU
backbone network. RSUs are operated and maintained by the TA and considered
as trustworthy by the network’s users. Received data packets at RSUs are securely
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forwarded to the corresponding health-care provider by using different mature In-
ternet security protocols (such as, IPSec). So it is sufficient to transmit the data
packet from rural area to any of the RSUs. In addition, RSUs also perform message
authentication and certificate validation. In this article RSUs are distributed in the
city area where network infrastructure is already exist.
• On-Board Units (OBUs): OBUs are installed on vehicles. A typical OBU can equip
with a GPS module and a short-range wireless communication module (e.g., DSRC
IEEE 802.11p [20]). Vehicles with OBUs also have sufficient processing capability
and data storage. It can communicate with an RSU or other vehicles in vicinity via
wireless connections. For simplicity, we refer to a vehicle as a vehicle equipped with
an OBU in the rest of this paper. A vehicle can be malicious if it is an attacker or
compromised by an attacker.
• Rural Access Point (RAP): In a rural area RAP is placed at social spots, such as
major road intersection, gas station, shopping store etc. It can temporarily store the
patient’s medical data and using short-range wireless communication forward it to
be relayed.
Figure 5.1: System model of proposed RuralCare scheme
In this paper, we divide the whole network into three phases; Phase-1) data communication
in a WBAN; phase-2) data communication between users and corresponding Rural Access
Point (RAP); and phase-3) communication among RAP, On Board Units (OBUs), and
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Road Side Units (RSUs), or destination. Vehicles are categorized into three types: a)
vehicles in the city (Type-1); b) vehicles in the rural area (Type-2); and c) vehicles traveling
between city and rural area (Type-3). Based on the different types, mobility and location
of vehicles are independent. Cooperative vehicles choose shortest path to route from one
place to another.
Wireless transmission network
We adopt Bluetooth technology in our proposed RuralCare scheme as the communication
standard in the WBAN environment. Different body sensors, such as accelerometer, blood
pressure and oxygen saturation (SpO2) and temperature sensors, frequently send the sen-
sory data to the PDA using this short range, low power communication protocol. Globally
used WiFi technology is used to carry the data packet at the RAP using opportunistic
data forwarding. Wireless access in vehicular environment can also assist in transferring
these data packets to the RAP end. However, communication between RAP and RSU is
only performed by VANETs using WiFi standard (IEEE 802.11 [70]). Dashed line in the
Fig.5.1 shows the network connectivity in the proposed RuralCare scheme.
5.3.2 Design Goals
Our design goal is to develop a delay-tolerant long-term patient health monitoring system,
where the network performance is enhanced by providing proper incentive to the coopera-
tive relay nodes, as well as data security and patient privacy is preserved. In our privacy
model, we consider how to protect a user identity privacy, where the adversary has a com-
plete view to eavesdrop all forwarding packets but RAP and RSUs are not compromisable.
RuralCare aims at achieving message integrity and source authentication, so that patient’s
sensitive PHI can deliver unaltered.
Security and Privacy requirements
We aim at achieving the following security objectives.
1. Message integrity and source authentication: All accepted messages should be de-
livered unaltered, and the origin of the messages should be authenticated by the
health-care service provider.
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2. Prevention of Packet analysis attack: Intermediate relay nodes have sufficient time
to analyze the data packet. The scheme should provide proper encryption protocol
so that eavesdropper can not be able to trace-out any valid, sensitive information
about patient.
3. Prevention of Ciphertext-only attack: The scheme should be secured enough to
prevent recover of the plaintext from a set of stored ciphertexts.
4. Provide patient privacy: Privacy is one of the important concerns from a patient
perspective. Illegal disclosure and improper use of patient’s PHI can cause legal
disputes and undesirable damaging in patient’s personal life. In all levels of the
communication, the scheme must provide patient identity privacy.
5. Resistant to intermediate nodes adding or dropping: Due to gain more incentive or
reward, some selfish nodes may modify or add false relay information by colluding
group of users. The scheme should be able to detect this type of attack.
6. Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation prevents either sender or receiver from denying
a transmitted message. To ensure the non-repudiation, the patient can not refute
the validity of a PHI afterward. As the intermediate routing nodes will get some
incentive, message non-repudiation must be ensured by the proposed scheme.
7. Secure Routing: In a multi-hop communication scenario, secure routing is required
for the sensitive patient health information. Due to the heterogenous wireless envi-
ronment, the scheme should provide secure and efficient routing of the sensitive data
packets.
Incentive Strategy
Performance of any delay-tolerant network usually depends on the cooperation of network’s
participants. In our proposed scheme, users and vehicles are awarded based on their par-
ticipation in the network. To ensure the fairness of the incentive protocol, the intermediate
forwarding nodes (either users or vehicles) can receive credit if and only if the destination
node receives the data packet (Case 1). Even though the packet is not delivered to the des-
tination, the relaying nodes still get good reputation values for their cooperation (Case 2).
Reputation function takes holding-time as a parameter and encourages to forward data-
packet earlier to maintain higher reputation value. To ensure more participation from the
network’s users, the TA defines reputation-threshold so that users crossing the threshold
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value will get some incentive as a bonus (Case 3). Processes of reward calculation is shown
in Equ. 5.1.
Rewardi =

Disti.CIP +Disti.RIP , Case 1
Disti.RIP , Case 2
IncentiveBonus, Case 3.
(5.1)
User can get a reward Disti.CIP + Disti.RIP if the data packet P arrives at the destina-
tion. Here, Dist is the distance that traveled by user/vechile, CIP is unit incentive credit
provided by the data packet’s source, and RIP is the fixed unit reputation provided by the
trusted RAP/TA. Reputation value RIP at any time Tn is formulated as
RIP (n) = e
−λTi .RIP (n−1) + CPRi,
where packet holding time Ti = Tn − Tn−1. Reputation value decreasing rate is λ, and
CPRi is the cumulative participant ratio calculated by RAP/TA as PFj.
∑T=n
T=n′
1
TPFTj
. It
is the ratio of the packet forwards (PF) by an individual user and total number of PF by
all users at any time period Tj = Tn − Tn′ . Reputation value decreasing rate,λ, can be
dynamically readjusted based on network density, data type, device energy level etc.
5.4 The Proposed RuralCare Scheme
In this section, we present the proposed RuralCare, including system setting, data for-
mation, secure patient health information transmission in different phases, incentive and
reputation granting, and PHI receiving at care-giver’s end. Patient’s identity and loca-
tion privacy, as well as secure transmission of sensitive PHI are considered to design our
proposed scheme. We adopted bilinear pairing as a cryptographic technique to design the
secure protocol and the basic review is described in chapter 2.
Before delving into the details of the proposed scheme, we first review the bilinear
pairing which is used as a cryptographic technique and serves the basis of the proposed
RuralCare scheme.
5.4.1 Notations and complexity assumptions:
Notations
If x,y are two strings, then x||y is the concatenation of x and y. If S is a finite set, s ∈R S
denotes sampling an element s uniformly at random from S. {0, 1}∗ denotes bit-string of
variable length and that converts to a defined group element by the notation {0, 1}∗ → G.
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Definition 1: Bilinear Parameters Generator (Gen): A bilinear parameter gen-
erator Gen is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter k as input and
output 5 tuple (q,G,GT, e, g) as the bilinear parameters, where q is a prime number with
|q| = k. G and GT are two cyclic groups of the same order q, g ∈ G is a generator, and
e : G×G→ GT is a non-degenerated and efficiently computable bilinear map.
Definition 2: Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem: The security
of the proposed system depends on the hardness of computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH)
problem, i.e., given < g, ga, gb > for g ∈ G and unknown a, b ∈ Z∗q, there is no algo-
rithm running in expected polynomial time, which can compute gab with non-negligible
probability.
5.4.2 The RuralCare Scheme
In this subsection, we present our proposed scheme RuralCare, which is designed with
major four parts, namely a) system initialization and registration; b) secure data commu-
nication in a WBAN environment; c) data communication between PDA and RAP; and
d) transfer data packet to RSU using OBUs. Patient, also refer as user in RuralCare, uses
WBAN that allows to continuous monitoring of physiological parameters (e.g., electrocar-
diogram (ECG), Electroencephalography(EEG), pulse rate, blood flow and oxygen levels,
pressure, and temperature) with physical activities. The WBAN’s gateway (e.g., PDA,
SmartPhone) then forwards the sensed data to the RAP directly or uses relay nodes (other
users/ vehicles) depends on the communication coverage. The forwarded data packet is
then temporally stored in RAP and wait until there is an opportunity to forward the packet
to RSUs at designated area using VANETs.
System Initialization
Let all users and the TA of RuralCare scheme’s use the same security parameters (S)
and public bilinear parameters (q, g, e,G,GT) that generated by the function Gen(S). The
proposed scheme then generates cryptographic hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ → G, H2 : G→
{0, 1}l, where l is any predefined bit string length. The scheme then initializes ENC()
and DEC() as public key cryptographic encryption and decryption protocols to be used in
WBAN and Enc() and Dec() as symmetric encryption and decryption protocols, i.e., AES,
or DES, to be used in phase-2 and phase-3 of data communication. TA picks up a random
number s ∈ Z∗q as a secret key, and computes the corresponding public key PTA = gs.
Finally, TA publishes the public system parameters (q,G,GT, e, g, PTA, H). Both patients
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and cooperative vehicles that relay data packets are considered as registered users of the
proposed scheme.
TA in RuralCare defines acceptable holding time (HT) for city and rural areas at the
initialization phase. This is the maximum acceptable time an authorized cooperative relay
node can store data packet before forwarding to the next available relay hope. TA chooses
this time based on the number of users, incentive rate, and distance between rural area
and urgency of sensed-data.
Registration Processes
Individual user, vehicle, and body-sensor need to be registered to the system before being
a part of the scheme. Registration processes have the following steps:
Step 1: Each RuralCare’s registered user has a unique identity Ui ∈ U , U = {U0...Un}
is the set of users, and Vi ∈ V , V = {V0...Vn} is the set of registered vehicles. TA checks
the individual identity and computes the pseudo-identity
PIDUi = H(sUi) and PIDVi = H(sVi) for the user and vehicle respectively. TA stores users
identities and their corresponding pseudo-identities locally. Users’ add their corresponding
pseudo-identities (PID) in the data packets and their identity privacy is guarantee as
others can not be able to know the real identities.
Step 2: TA chooses appropriate medical body sensors based on patient’s require-
ment. It then generates a serial number (SN) for the sensor using the patient’s identity
and sensor’s manufacture defined unique Media Access Control (MAC) address, SN =
H(Ui||MACsensor). Generated sensor’s serial number (SN) then stores in the registered
user’s PDA that will be used as gateway in WBAN environment.
Step 3: RuralCare’s registered user chooses a random number xi ∈R Z∗q as its private
key. The user then computes the corresponding public key as PKUi = g
xi .
Step 4: TA/RAP creates personal reputation account (PRA) and personal credit ac-
count (PCA) for each registered user.
Secure Communication Processes
Here, we describe different communication phases. We first describe the secure commu-
nication processes between body-sensor and PDA. Thereafter, we present steps for com-
munication between PDA and RAP, and RAP and RSU. We use ‘node’ in phase− 2 and
phase− 3 to refer user and vehicle, respectively.
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Phase-1: Communication between body-sensors and gateway (PDA)
Secure communication between body-sensors and PDA is described in Chapter 3. The
secure communication is ensured by following a hybrid encryption policy. We use public-key
cryptography to securely shared a secret key among the sensors, after that symmetric-key
cryptography is used to encrypt the data.
Phase-2: Communication between Users and RAP
After receiving the data packet at the PDA using phase-1, the user needs to transmit the
sensed data to the local wireless access point, RAP. Steps toward secure data communica-
tion between the user and RAP using cooperative vehicles or other users (equipped with
mobile wireless devices) as relay nodes are described as below:
Step 1: User U0 with private-public key pair (x0, PKU0 = g
x0) computes first the
shared key Kud = PK
u0
d = g
x0xd , where (xd, PKd = g
xd) is the private-public key pair of
the destination RAP. User ‘U0’ equipped with body sensors, aggregates the sensed data
(‘m’) and encrypts as E = Encksd(m).
Step 2: Determine a proper incentive policy (IP ). Based on the significance of the
sensed data, user chooses a packet-valid-time (PV T ) and generates the data packet Mu =
PIDUi ||LU0||D||IP ||SessionID||PacketID||PV T ||TS.
Here, LU0 is the location information, D is the corresponding access point/destination
identity, and TS is the time-stamp that indicates packet generating time.
Step 3: User then generates verifiable encrypted signatures Sigs and Sig0 as shown in
equations 6.3 and 5.3. Later on, Sig0 is replaced by the aggregated signature Sigagg that
generates by multiplying secure key of the intermediate nodes.
Sigs = PK
H(Mu||E)+u0)
d (5.2)
Sig0 = u0H(E||LU0 ||TS) (5.3)
Step 4: Intermediate relay node, U1, first checks the IP and take the routing decision
based on the proposed incentive policy. If U1 feels interested in routing the data packet, it
then verifies the validity of Sig0 with the equation e(Sig0, g)
?
= e(PKU0 , H(E||LU0||TS)) and calculates the difference between current time and received
packet’s TS. If the difference is less than PV T , U1 sends acknowledgement (ACK) to the
sender U0.
Step 5: Let U0 → U1...Ui → Ud be the current packet forwarding path. In each
routing step, intermediate node calculates short signature, Sigj = uj.H(PIDUj ||LUj ||TS)
and computes aggregate signature as
Sigagg ← Sigj.
∏j−1
i=0 Sigi.
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Figure 5.2: Data Packet architecture of RuralCare scheme
Intermediate node Uj verifies the aggregate signature as
e(Sigagg, g)
?
=
e(PKU0 , H(E||LU0||TS))
∏j−1
i=1 e(PKUi , H(Mi))
Here Mi = PIDPIDi ||LUi ||TSi.
Cooperative intermediate nodes are also attached nodes’ pseudo-identities, location
information, and time-stamp (TS), as shown in Fig. 5.2. Cooperative intermediate nodes
also store hashed value of the received data packet with their current location information
as a receipt. In a non-cooperative environment, these receipts will be submitted to the TA
to collect their individual rewards.
Step 6: Steps 4 and 5 will be repeated until the packet reached at RAP . It then obtains
the aggregate signature as Sigagg ← Sig0
∏d−1
i=1 Sigi and verifies the validity of Sigs and
Sigagg as e(Sigs, g
H(Mu||E).PKUo)
?
= e(PKD, g), and e(Sigagg, g)
?
=
e(PKU0 , H(E||LU0||TS))
∏d−1
i=1 e(PKUi , H(Mi)),
here Mi = (PIDUi ||LUi ||TSi).
Step 7: RAP now removes the details of next hop forwarding node set and provides in-
centive, or updates reputation of the participated users in our proposed RuralCare scheme.
Phase-3:Communication between RAP and RSUs
In our system model, all RSUs are securely connected to the TA and located at the
city area, so it is sufficient to deliver the packet to any RSUs using VANETs. Steps in
phase-3 are same as Phase-2, except some identities are changed. Vehicles (type-2) in the
rural area are cooperate as packet carrier and search for any vehicle going towards the
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city, and vehicles (type-3) going towards city are treated as packet forwarder. The RAP
follows packet forwarding step− 4 and step− 5 of the phase− 2. Intermediate cooperative
vehicles,(V1...d−1), calculate short signature as
Sigi = vi.H(PIDi||LVi ||TSi); i := 1..d − 1. Intermediate nodes verify the aggregate
signature before forwarding it to the next cooperative node. When the packet reaches
to any RSU, indicated as destination ‘D’, the RSU verifies the validity of the message as
shown in step − 6. It then decrypts the message ‘m’ as m = Decksd(E), and provides the
incentive and rewards to the participated vehicles (V1...Vd−1).
5.4.3 Signature Correctness
The correctness of Sigs and Sigagg are given as follows:
e(Sigs, g
H(Mu||E).PKUo)
= e(PK
1
H(Mu||E)+u0
d , g
H(Mu||E).guo) = e(PKd, g) (5.4)
e(Sigagg, g) = e(Sig0
∏d−1
i=1 Sigi, g)
= e(u0H(E||LU0 ||TS).
∏d−1
i=1 Sigi, g)
= e(PKU0 , H(E||LU0||TS)).
∏d−1
i=1 e(PKUi , H(Mi))
5.4.4 Incentive and Reputation Granting:
The TA/RAP provides incentive or reputation to the cooperative nodes as demonstrated
in Algorithm 2.
5.5 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyses different security and privacy issues of the proposed RuralCare
scheme. Notice that ‘node’ and ‘user or vehicle’ are used interchangeably.
Resilience to Packet Analysis Attack: In the proposed scheme, a source node
U0 has encrypted the sensitive message m into E = Encksd(m). The adversary can not
recover m and knows user’s physiological medical information without knowing both of the
user’s and RAP’s secret keys. Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) hardness, described
in section II, ensures that even the adversary knows the public keys, he can not generate
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Algorithm 2 Incentive and Reputation Confirmation
Require: The RAP and TA obtain aggregate signature and verify the validity of the
message.
1: Get the location information, LV0 , LV1 , ....LVd−1 , measure each intermediate node relay
distance Disi = |LUi − LUi−1| and their routing direction with types.
2: for i=1 to d− 1 do
3: if Data packet reaches destination and the total routing time ≤ PVT then
4: Provide incentive Ci = Disi × CIP , as described in the incentive-strategy subsec-
tion.
5: else
6: Provide reward Ri = Disi × RIP and incentive if accumulated rewards exceed
some predefined reputation-threshold.
7: end if
8: Store the Ci and Ri in the individual PCA and PRA account respectively.
9: end for
the shared key in an expected polynomial time. The adversary can get only the location
(LU0) information, but this information does not has any link to the user’s original identity.
Moreover, any intermediate node is not allowed to hold relaying packet for an undefined
time due to the packet validity time period (PVT). This parameter also reduces the prob-
ability of eavesdropping attack because the computation time needed to break the CDH
hardness is far more than the PVT.
RuralCare ensures message integrity and source authentication: RuralCare
ensures end-to-end message integrity. Users register their body-sensors at the initialization
phase and TA generates public-private key pair and pseudo-identities for these devices.
Sensor’s pseudo-identity is a hashed value of respective user identity and sensor’s Media
Access Control (MAC) address. This pseudo-identity (PIDSN) is used for message encryp-
tion and signature during the communication between body-sensors and PDA. It ensures
message integrity at the user’s end. On the other hand, RuralCare uses sender’s secret
key to generate the signature Sigs, and the receiver can verifies the signature by using
the public parameters of the sender, shown in Equ. 4. This verification ensures corre-
sponding source authentication. Hashed value of the encrypted message along with others
system parameters are integrated with Sigs and Sigagg, which ensures message integrity
with non-repudiation.
Resistent to intermediate-node removing or adding:
RuralCare scheme uses aggregate group signature, where secret key of each intermediate
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relay nodes is multiplied with the original signature. If any selfish node removes previous
relaying nodes’ identities, the validity of the signature will be failed and encrypted message
will be treated as invalid. Honest cooperative nodes in that case submit their received
packet to the TA, and the TA can easily catch out the misbehaving nodes by checking
the submitted users aggregate signatures. The TA will then remove this selfish node and
thus resist intermediate-node removing or adding. Moreover, this resistent helps to grow
up cooperative attitude among all authorized users of the proposed RuralCare scheme.
RuralCare provides user’s identity privacy: We use users’ pseudo-identities
instated of their real identities to provide user’s identity privay, and these pseudo-identities
are periodically updated and maintained by the TA. Publicly available pseudo-identities are
generated by using one way cryptographic hash function and computing real-identity from
these pseudo-identities is impossible since keyed hash is one-way. To make these pseudo-
identities more indistinguishable, the TA periodically update user’s pseudo-identities.
RuralCare provides fairness: RuralCare user’s only pays credits to the cooperative
intermediate users/vehiles based on distance that they travel to relay the data packet.
However, if the data packet will not reach at the destination, the user won’t pay any
credits and it is fair to the user’s perspective. The intermediate users/vehiles who are not
responsible for the non-cooperative packet drooping, will gain reputation values from the
TA. The RSUs and RAP always give priority to the highly reputed users. Even, if their
aggregated reputation values cross the pre-defined threshold, they will get some incentive
from the TA for their cooperative behavior. Thus, intermediate users or vehicles feel fair
to forward RuralCare’s data packet and improve the network performance.
Resistent to the eavesdropping attacks: An eavesdropping attacker aims at ac-
cessing the private and sensitive patient’s medical data. The CDH hardness (details in
Basic of Bilinear Pairing subsection) ensures that the proposed scheme is resistant to this
eavesdropping attack. Moreover, any intermediate node is not allowed to hold relaying
packet for a undefined time due to the packet validity time period (PVT). This parameter
also reduce the probability of eavesdropping attack because of computation time needed
to break the CDH hardness is far more than the PVT.
5.6 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of RuralCare in terms of probabilistic model,
cryptographic overhead, average delivery ratio, and delay.
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5.6.1 Probabilistic Model
We conduct a probabilistic model to analyze the relation among the total number of users
(n) in a given region, probability of having acceptable incentive rate (pi) agreed by inter-
mediate relay nodes, and the successful packet forward probability (Pf ).
Figure 5.3: Relation among Pf , pi, and n
Let E(Ai) be the event that there are i cooperative nodes, and n − i be the number
of non-cooperative nodes in a specific area. Let E(Pf ) be the event that there is at least
a node that agree with the incentive policy and will verify the message to relay to the
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next-hop node. Using the equation of total probability, the relation among Pr(Pf ), n, and
Pr(Pi) can be represented as:
Pr(Pf ) =
n∑
i=0
Pr(E(Pf )|E(Ai)).P r(E(Ai)) = 1 + (1− pi)n − 2(1− pi
2
)n.
Here, (1 − pi)i is the probability that none of the i users agrees the incentive policy,
(1 − (1 − pi)i) is the probability that there is at least one cooperative node that accept
the incentive policy, and (1− (1− pi)n−i) is the probability that there will be at least one
non-cooperative node may feel interest to relay the message to the next-hop and accept
the incentive policy. Hence, Pr(E(Ai)) =
(
n
i
)
(1/2)i(1 − 1
2
)n−i and Pr(E(Pf )|E(Ai)) =
(1 − (1 − pi)i)(1 − (1 − pi)n−i); each user position is independent and follows binomial
distribution. Fig. 5.3 shows the relation among Pr(Pf ), Pr(Pi), and n. It can be seen that
Pr(Pf ) increases as either Pr(Pi) or n increases. Fixing the packet forwarding probability,
Pr(Pf ) , more than 90%, we have to ensure either large number of users or higher incentive
policy. For example, when Pr(Pi) is 15%, we have to ensure number of user is greater than
or equal to 40 to have 91% of Pr(Pf ). But for a low number of users n = 10, we have to
confirm Pr(Pi) ≥ 55% to have more than 90% of Pr(Pf ).
5.6.2 Cryptographic Overhead
In our layered packet architecture, the elements in G could be up to 160 bits [66]. We
assume the Sig is 20 bytes, E is 120 bytes, and all other fields are 4 bytes. If there are
n-intermediate nodes in the network, the communication overhead is around 140 + 24.n+
20 + |Sigagg| bytes, |Sigagg| denotes the length of aggregate signature that minimize the
packet length in a layered architecture [66].
Time Cost: We consider 20ms and 550ms as the computation time for the pairing
using personal computer and personal digital assistant (PDA) that used as gateway in
WBAN [71]. Computing cost of pairing at OBUs is expected to be same as personal
computer. In [52], it is shown that a single pairing Tpair needs about 10 times more
to compute than a multiplication Tmul. Proposed RuralCare’s signature and verification
processes need Tpair + Tmul and 2.Tpair + Tmul operations, respectively. Based on the time
analysis, we use 600ms and 20ms as the signing time for user and vehicle, respectively.
5.6.3 Simulation
We implement RuralCare scheme using a custom event-driven simulator built in Java, and
consider three types of vehicles in the simulation scenario: type-1: only driving in the city
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Parameter Value Range
City area 5000m× 6000m
Rural area 10000m× 6000m
DTN nodes N=60, 100
Velocity 50km/h, 80km/h
Packet interval Every 20min
Communication range
PDA 200m
RAP 350m
OBUs 100m
RSUs 350m
Simulation time 12-hrs
Incentive Rate (IR) 50,70,90
Table 5.1: Simulation Parameters
area, type-2: driving in rural area, and type-3: driving between city and rural areas.
At first, we evaluate the performance by changing number of deployed RSUs and ac-
ceptable packet-holding time (HT ) at the city area. Here, HT is the valid time duration by
which the data packet has to be forwarded to the next cooperative relay node. Considering
the city area as 5km× 6km, we deploy RSU in every 30km2 refer as RSU-1, every 10km2
refer as RSU-3, and every 6km2 refer as RSU-5. Packet-holding time HT chooses as 45
min and 120 min. Simulation results demonstrate that deploying more RSUs have a good
impact on the delivery ratio (Figs. 5.4 and 5.5) and by increasing the packet-holding time,
intermediate relay nodes have got more chance to deliver data packets at the destination.
But compare to RSU-1, RSU-3 and 5 have almost identical performance using long hold-
ing time (2hrs). Based on this observation, we deploy RSUs in every 10km2 (RSU-3) and
prefer to use long packet-valid-time (PVT) for the rest of simulations.
We run the rest of simulations in an area of 15000×6000m for 12 hours (assumed PV T
=12 hours), where road intersections are located at every 1km and 5km in the city and
rural area, respectively. Other simulation parameters are summarized in Table 5.1.
In our simulation, we deploy 60% of nodes in the city area (type-1), 20% in the rural
area (type-2), and the rest are traveling forward and backward between the city and rural
areas (type-3).
Figs. 5.6 and 5.7 show the impact of vehicle’s speed, incentive rate, and number of
vehicles on the packet delivery ratio over a period of time. By increasing the vehicle’s
speed, we can achieve better packet delivery ratio compare to lower speed having the same
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Figure 5.4: Packet delivery ratio with HT=45min
Figure 5.5: Packet delivery ratio with HT=2hrs
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Figure 5.6: Delivery ratio with N=60
Figure 5.7: Delivery ratio with N=100
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Figure 5.8: Average delay within 12 hours simulation with number of vehicles N=60 and
100
incentive rate. For example, around 20% more packet delivery ratio can be achieved by
increasing vehicle’s speed from 50km/h to 80km/h at the fourth hour of simulation with
N=60 (Fig.5.6). Increasing incentive rate motivates participating vehicles to relay other
data packet and it assists to increase the packet delivery ratio too. Simulation results
demonstrate that we can achieve around 80% of packet delivery ratio having V=80,IR=90
and N=60 at the 9th hour. It is around 30% more compare to that of IR=50.
Fig.5.7 shows that higher packet delivery ratio can be achieved by increasing the number
of participating users, N. For example, at the 4th hour, we can get around 30% packet
delivery ratio having N=100, V=50, and IR=50, but with N=60 we can achieve only 20%.
To ensure higher packet delivery ratio, we need to confirm either higher incentive rate or
large number of participant users.
Fig.5.8 depicts the average end-to-end delay with 12 hours of simulation having varia-
tion in number of nodes (N) and incentive-rates (IR). We can see that increasing number
of nodes and incentive-rate reduce the average delay and the average delay varies between
50-minutes and 120-minutes.
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5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a delay-tolerant secure long-term health care system,
RuralCare, for monitoring patients located at rural area. RuralCare ensures secure and pri-
vacy preserving data aggregation using body sensors in WBAN environment. It describes
data forwarding steps from the patient end to the care-giver’s end that also achieves dif-
ferent security and privacy requirements. The fairness among all cooperative participants
in RuralCare is guaranteed by adopting proper incentive and reputation policies. These
policies also improve the network performance in terms of high delivery ratio and low aver-
age delay. Through extensive security and performance analyses, it has been demonstrated
that RuralCare is highly effective to resist possible security attacks and efficient to provide
emerging health care to patient resides at the rural area.
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Chapter 6
Enabling Patient-centric Access
Control of Aggregated Data in Cloud
Computing
6.1 Introduction
In our previous chapters, we have described the high potentiality of eHealth care system
in terms of improving quality of diagnosis, reducing medical costs and helping address the
reliable and on-demand health care challenges posed by the aging society. We addressed
different data aggregation solutions based on patient’s residency and communication net-
work availability. In addition to the secure data aggregation, the eHealth care system needs
to ensure the availability of PHI in electronic form adheres to the same levels of privacy
and disclosure policy as applicable to present-day paper-based patient-records accessible
only from the physician’s office. Instead of storing the PHI locally, the recent advancement
of cloud computing allows us to store all PHI at the cloud storage and ensures availabil-
ity with reduces the capital and operational expenditures [72]. In cloud storage (or data
storage as a service), data is stored on multiple third-party servers where the storage can
be administrated on demand. Migrating patients PHI into this cloud storage offers enor-
mous conveniences to the eHealth care providers, since they do not have to care about the
complexities of direct hardware management [7]. However, computerized PHI are open to
potential abuse and security threats. Storing large amounts of patient’s sensitive medical
data in third-party cloud storage is vulnerable to loss, leakage, or theft [73]. In addition,
patient’s privacy with proper access control to cloud storage is a growing concern in the
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eHealth care industry due to its direct involvement to human. Stored data confidentiality
is considered as one of the biggest challenges raised by cloud storage environment. Espe-
cially in a public clouds environment, which are operated by commercial service providers
and shared by various other customers, data confidentiality is a desired property.
Traditional data access schemes which are used to provide data confidentiality are
mostly depend on the system itself to enforce authorization policies and rely on the system
trusted infrastructure. Providing data confidentiality by server side data encryption is not
also appropriate for the health application when the server is not fully trusted. In addition,
patient’s privacy with proper access control to cloud storage is a growing concern in the
eHealth care industry due to its direct involvement to human. Patient generally wants to
be sure that his sensitive health information can only be accessed by particular authorized
users and his original identity will not be exposed. In order to assure the privacy of PHI, we
propose efficient and secure patient-centric access control (ESPAC) scheme which allows
data requesters to have different access privileges based on their roles, and then assigns
different attribute sets to them.
To store PHI in a cloud storage with patient-centric access control privilege, we use
ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption [74] in ESCAP. Identity based encryption is
adopted to ensure secure end-to-end communication among patient, eHealth care service
provider, and cloud storage. Our contributions are in three-fold: a) provide an architectural
model of eHealth care system, b) show how ESPAC provides a secure communication
between remote patient and eHealth care provider, and c) present an patient-centric access
control policy that helps ESPAC to has more reliability. To construct this access control
policy, we assign different attribute sets to data requesters based on their relation to the
patient. For example, general users may know some common attributes of a patient,
e.g., location, gender; patient’s relatives or health care givers may know more private
information of a patient, likely medication details, patient date of birth, patient phone
number, etc.; health insurance providers may have more privileges and can know patient
health card number, Social Identification number, etc.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief descrip-
tion of related work. System model and security requirements are presented in Section 3.
Preliminaries such as bilinear pairing, security definition are introduced in Section 4. The
proposed ESPAC scheme is presented in Section 5. Section 6 and Section 7 provide security
analysis and performance analysis of the proposed ESPAC scheme respectively. Section 8
introduced M-ESPEC, the modified version of the ESPAC. The chapter is concluded in
Section 8.
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6.2 Related Works
Existing research works related to proposed ESPAC includes i) secure and privacy preserv-
ing eHealth care system ii) attribute-based encryption and iii) access control over untrusted
cloud storage.
Hybrid security policy for WBANs with Quality of Services (QoS) have recently been
proposed for secure eHealth care system in [56]. Public key cryptography is used for
session key management and private key cryptography is used for regular data encryption
in WBANs environment. Due to the nature of the real-time traffic, emergency health
application traffic is given high priority compare to other applications traffic. Lu. et
al. propose a mobile health care social network, where two patients can communicate
each other if they have the same symptoms [75]. Performance analyzes demonstrate that
emergency response time can be minimized by using proposed mobile health-care social
network. Lin et al. present a privacy preserving scheme for health care that can effectively
works against global adversary [76]. Both content and contextual privacy can be achieved
by the proposed work.
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE), a novel extension from identity based encryption by
enabling expressive access policy to control the decryption process is first presented in [77].
Key Policy Attribute-based Encryption (KP-ABE) and Ciphertext Policy Attribute-based
Encryption (CP-ABE) are the two main variants of ABE proposed so far. In both cases,
user has a set of attributes that associate with user’s private key. The attribute set is used
to describe a user’s credentials. In KP-ABE, user’s private key is embedded with an access
policy, whereas ciphertext is encrypted by an pre-defined access policy in CP-ABE [2,74].
Liang et al. [78] present a patient self-controllable access policy so that patients would have
the primary control of the access to their own personal health information.
Health records sharing and integrating in health care cloud is discussed in [79]. The ar-
ticle describes the security reference model for managing different security issues in health-
care clouds. Yu et al. propose a fine gained data access control in cloud computing based on
KP-ABE [7]. Confidentiality of user access privilege and user secret key accountability can
be achieved by the work. A mandatory access control model to protect patient’s metadata
with privacy is presented in [80]. It is shown that the use of fragmentation after encryption
greatly improves overall security because potential attackers need to compromise more data
file to gain access. Without disclosing the data contents, data owner delegates most of the
computation tasks involved in fine-grained data access control to untrusted cloud server
by combining techniques of attribute-based encryption, proxy re-encryption, and lazy re-
encryption. An efficient cloud storage sharing scheme is presented in [81]. The scheme
works on hierarchical identity based encryption, where intended recipients can share the
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file by using their private keys. G. Wang et al. combine hierarchical identity-based en-
cryption and CP-ABE to achieve fine-grained access control in cloud storage services [82].
Most of the current works encrypt PHI before being stored at cloud with defined access
policy at storage server. But this approach does not ensure patient centric access control
and has a risk to have inside attack. Most of them use ciphertext-policy attribute based
encryption (CP-ABE) [74] to construct the access policies and assign different attribute sets
to data requesters based on their relation to the data owner [83] [84] [85] [86]. However,
there are some common drawbacks existing on those works. If the data requester can
submit all the attributes correctly, CP-ABE executes on the root node of the access tree
and decrypt the encrypted PHI. This can open the door of potential privacy exposure, as
the cloud can collide with data requester to get access to the PHI too. To perform user
revocation, the cloud needs to re-encrypts all stored PHI with different access architecture.
It costs a huge computation overhead to the cloud and increases the eHealth expenditure
because cloud service provider (CSP) will demand more service cost to perform additional
computation tasks. In addition, it is not practical to delegate all access control tasks to
the third party CSP [87].
6.3 System Model and Security Requirements
In this section, we define the system model and then describe the security requirements of
the proposed ESPAC scheme.
6.3.1 System Model
In our system model, we define the following entities:
1. Trusted Authority (TA): It generates the public and secret key parameters for the
ESPAC. The trusted authority is responsible for attributes’ keys issuing, revoking,
and updating. It grants differential access rights to individual users based on their
attributes and roles. Trusted authority also maintains an index-table, where it stores
the location of distributed data storage server. Authorized health service providers
(e.g., Hospital, urgent care) are denoted as trusted parties.
2. Cloud Service Provider: It provides data outsourcing services and consists of data
servers and data service manager. The main responsibility of the data storage server
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is to serve and retrieve data according to authorized users’ request. Data service man-
ager negotiates with health-care service provider to control the access from outside
users to the stored encrypted data.
3. Registered User: Patient who is registered to the trusted authority is considered as
registered user. A Registered User is responsible for defining attribute-based access
policy and encrypting the sensitive PHI under the predefined policy before storing
at the cloud-storage.
4. Data-access requester: Cloud users who request to access some specific PHI are called
the data-access requester. The ESPAC scheme ensures that any data-access requester
can only decrypts the encrypted data if and only if he can successfully completes the
access-policy.
The encrypted data is stored in a centralized storage, health-cloud, for future access.
Based on the major operations, the proposed scheme can be classified into four major
steps, as shown in Fig 6.1.
Health Service
Provider
Encrypted
Medical
Data
Message verification
and enforce access
control
Encrypted data
stored in Health Cloud
Service provide
Data access requestor
Access request
 and
Authorization
Submit attribute set
Patient securely transmit
 a secret key to construct the
access tree
Decrypted data
Patient at home
Patient at hospital
Step 1
Step 2
Steps 3 and  4
Figure 6.1: Major steps of the proposed ESPAC scheme
Step 1 (PHI collection): In this initial step, using different body sensors, PHI is sensed
and ready to be transmitted to the trusted eHealth care service provider.
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Step 2 (Secure data communication): In this step, public key cryptography is used
to securely transfers collected PHI to the eHealth care service provider. Patient securely
transfer a secret key to the trusted eHealth care provider, if he authorized the service
provider to build-up the access tree.
Step 3 (PHI processing at eHealth care provider): After receiving the PHI securely,
eHealth care service provider classifies the PHI based on the attributes set chosen by the
patient. It then makes different privacy levels of data requesters based on their roles (e.g.,
level-1: general users, level-2: pharmacist, level-3: doctors, etc.) and assigns different set
of attributes to these different levels.
Step 4 (Transfer PHI to the cloud storage and control access): After the data classifi-
cation, encrypted data securely transfers to the cloud storage, shows as ‘Health Cloud’ in
the Figure 6.1. eHealth care service providers may operate either real-time or periodically
based on the existing infrastructures. Data-access requester sends request to the cloud
storage with a data block identity. They may also request for the corresponding attribute
sets. In this case, the cloud storage provider communicates with the eHealth care service
provider and verifies the authentication of the requesters. The data requester, as a node
in the access tree (T), can decrypt a ciphertext if and only if other corresponding nodes
(users) also cooperate with him, or he has all the attribute sets to complete the T.
In our system model, we classify the data requester as health worker, physicians, re-
searchers, insurance companies, and agencies, etc. Some of them only need the accumulated
number of patients in a specific area, some need disease related syndromes, age and gen-
der specific characteristics, while others may need medication details. Figure 6.2 shows
possible access structures based on different privacy levels, where intermediate nodes work
as a logic gates. For example, “2 of (location, gender, disease)” in the Figure 6.2(a) can
be converted to “(location AND gender) OR (gender AND disease) OR (disease AND
location)”.
6.3.2 Security Requirements
We aim at achieving the following security objectives.
1. Patient-centric access control: The system should provide patient-centric access con-
trol, where a patient can decide who can get the access to his/her stored PHI.
2. Message integrity, source authentication and non-repudiation: All accepted messages
should be delivered unaltered, and the origin of the messages should be authenticated
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Figure 6.2: Access trees based on different data privacy level
by the eHealth care service provider. To ensure the non-repudiation, the patient can
not refute the validity of a PHI afterward.
3. Prevention of Ciphertext-only attack: The system should be secured enough to
prevent recover of the plaintext from a set of stored ciphertexts.
4. Provide patient privacy: Privacy is one of the important concerns from a patient per-
spective. Illegal disclosure and improper use of patient PHI can cause legal disputes
and undesirable damaging in patient’s personal life.
5. Resistant to collusion attack: If multiple users collude, generally they may be able
to decrypt a ciphertext by combining their attributes. Users can not get any access
to the encrypted data even by sharing information in a group.
6. Resistant to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack: The DoS attack may be caused due to
the large groups of legitimate users access the eHealth care service provider at the
same time, or the attacker continuously launch false traffic with a high data rate.
The system should ensure acceptable QoS level to resist the DoS attack.
6.4 Definations
Bilinear pairing and the attribute-based ciphertext policy (CP-ABE) work as the basis of
our proposed scheme, we briefly review some related definitions of CP-ABE , which closely
follow those in [30].
Definition (BDH Parameter Generator): An algorithm Gen is called a BDH (Bi-
linear Diffe-Hellman) parameter generator if Gen takes a sufficient large security parameter
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K > 0 as input, runs in polynomial time in K, outputs a prime number q, the description
of two groups G1 and G2 of order q, and the description of a bilinear map e : G1×G1 → G2.
Definition (BDH Problem hardness): Given a random element P ∈ G1, as well
as aP ,bP ,cP , for some random a, b, c ∈ Z∗q; there is no efficient algorithm to compute
e(P, P )abc ∈ G2 from P, aP, bP, cP ∈ G1. This implies the hardness of the BDH in the
group G1 [30].
Definition (Access Structure [74]): Let {a1, a2, ....., an} be a set of health at-
tributes. The sets A (A ⊂ 2{a1,a2,...,an}) are called the authorized attributes set, and the
sets not in A are called the unauthorized sets. A is monotone if ∀B,C : ifB ⊆ A and
B ⊆ C then C ⊆ A.
In the access-tree construction, ciphertexts are labeled with a set of descriptive autho-
rized attributes. Secret keys are identified by an access tree in which each interior node of
the tree is a threshold gate and the leaves are associated with attributes.
Setup(1t): The probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) setup algorithm takes as input a
security parameter 1t. It outputs the public parameters PK and a master key MK which
is known only to the private key generator.
Encrypt1(PKs,m,PKr) : The encryption algorithm takes the public parameters of
the sender and receiver and encrypt the message ‘m’ by doing mapping and XOR opera-
tions. We use Encrypt2(PK,M,A) function to encrypt the message M and store in the
health cloud. This encryption algorithm takes the system public parameters PK, a mes-
sage M, and an access structure A over the universe of health attributes. The encrypted
ciphertext CT can only be decrypted if and only if the user possesses the set of health
attributes that satisfy the access tree structure.
Decrypt1(PK,C,d) : The decryption algorithm takses as input the public parameter
PK, ciphertext C, and the product of the receiver’s secret key and sender PK’s hash value.
The health care provider uses this function to decrypt the encrypt message sent by the
user for further processing. Another decryption function Decrypt2(PK,CT, SK) takes as
input the public parameters PK, a ciphertext CT, which contains the access policy A, and
a secret key SK, which is a private key for a set S of health attributes. If the set S of
attributes satisfies the access structure A, the algorithm will decrypt the ciphertext and
return the message M.
The set of algorithms must satisfy the standard consistency requirements: For (PK,MK)←
Setup(1t) (MK is the system Master Key), (k,E)← Encryption(PK, γ), DA ← KeyGen(PM,MK,A)
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and A(γ) = 1 (i.e. the attribute set γ satisfies the access structure A), then we have
Pr[Decryption(PK,E(M), DA) = k] = 1.
6.5 Proposed ESPAC Scheme
The four major categories that have described in the system model can be further integrated
into two major phases, as shown in Fig 6.3.
Figure 6.3: Two major phases of the proposed scheme
6.5.1 Phase-A: secure data communication:
In the phase-A, the scheme defines the secure and privacy preserving communication be-
tween different eHealth users. Here, we describe the secure communication steps between
a remote user and an eHealth service provider; communication among others e.g., eHelath
service provider and the cloud storage or data requesters will follow the same steps.
Step 1 (System initialization): Given the security parameter S
′
, the bilinear pa-
rameters (q,G1, G2, e, P ) are generated by the function setup(S
′
). It is assumed that a
unique ID is given to the health care provider (HCP) by a trusted authority and the
health service providers will do the following initializations:
• Select a random number α ∈R Z∗q and compute the public key PKhcp = α.P ;
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• Generate the hash function H1 : {0, 1} → G∗1 and compute the key Khcp = H1(ID)
for message encryption and decryption;
• Generate the secure hash function
H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n, H3 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗1 and H4 : G2 → {0, 1}∗.
• Compute the remote user’s pseudo-identity (UPID) = H2(UID), and store a copy of
it for future verification;
• Securely distribute UPID, H2, H3, and H4 to its subscribers.
• For attribute-based Encryption and Decryption, the TA chooses two random number
α¯, β¯ ∈ Zp, p is the prime order with generator g.
• Compute public key, PK = G, g, h = gβ¯, f = g1/β¯, e(g, g)α¯. (details in [74])
• Compute master key, MK = (β¯, gα¯).
An individual user (U) will do the following steps:
• User Chooses a random number r ∈R Z∗q and computes the public key PKU = r.P
• User selects a random number β ∈R Z∗q , to calculate the session key Pβ = β.P
• User computes the message token T = H2(m|UPID|session id) and sends it to the
receiver along with encrypted data and session key.
Step 2 (Secure message communication): After the system initialization, both
parties use the data encryption and decryption algorithms to securely transmit their data.
Here, we show how an user will encrypt the message ‘m’ (Equ.6.1) and decrypt the en-
crypted message by the corresponding eHealth care service provider. The user encrypts
the message, m, based on the public key of the corresponding receiver using the identity
based encryption [30].
v = Encrypt1(PKhcp,m, PKU) = m⊕H4(grU) (6.1)
Here, QU = H3(UPID); H3 : {0, 1}∗ → G∗1, a random oracle; gu = e(QU , PKhcp), and
H4 : G2 → {0, 1}∗, a random oracle.
The encrypted message is decrypted using the Dec(PKU , v, d) function, where d =
αH3(UPID) and α is the secret key of the corresponding agent.
Decrypt1(PKU , v, d) = m (6.2)
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Decrypt1(PKU , v, d) = v ⊕H4(e(d, PKU)
= v ⊕H4(e(αH3(UPID)), rP )
= v ⊕H4(e(H3(UPID), P )rα)
= v ⊕H4(e(H3(UPID), αP )r)
= (m⊕H4(gru)⊕H4(gru)) = m
Step 3 (Message Signature and Verification): To ensure data integrity, the re-
ceiver will verify the message signature after receiving it. By doing it, the eHealth service
provider can verifies the data originated from the specific patient and can not be altered
after signing it. We use the cryptographic digital signature (Equ.(6.3)), based on the bi-
linear pairing to provide data integrity. The patient first creates a session key Pβ = βP ,
here β ∈R Z∗q , and computes the message token T . He then computes the signature using
the equation (6.3).
S =
1
v + β + r + T
P (6.3)
The eHealth service provider verifies the signature by using the equation (6.4).
e(vP + Pβ + PKUPDA + TP, S) = e(P, P ) (6.4)
e(vP + Pβ + PKUPDA + TP, S)
= e((v + β + r + T )P, (v + β + r + T )−1P )
= e(P, P )(v+β+r+T )(v+β+r+T )
−1
= e(P, P )
6.5.2 Phase B: Control of data requesters access
In a traditional public key cryptography system, the receiver and sender need each other
public parameters to encrypt a message. But in the eHealth care system, the patient
does not have any knowledge about the data requester or does not know who is going to
access his PHI. Therefore, the security scheme by itself has to be capable to grant access
control remotely. We use attribute-based ciphertext policy with privacy leveling to solve
this challenge. Based on the different roles of the data requesters, an access tree is created
and the requester needs to provide corresponding attributes (nodes of the tree) to have the
secret key and thereafter he can use the secret key to decrypt the encrypted data (PHI).
Providing falls attributes will stop the decryption processes immediately and the data
requester learns nothing more than the attributes he/she is entitled. Details construction
of the access tree with related key-generation, encryption, and decryption algorithms are
described below.
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Access Tree (T): Let T represent an access structure. Each non-leaf node of the tree
represents a threshold gate. If numx is the number of children of a node x and kx is the
threshold value, then 0 ≤ kx ≤ numx. When kx = 1, the threshold gate is an OR gate,
when kx = numx, it is an AND gate, finally when 1 ≤ kx ≤ numx, it is a combination of
AND and OR gates (Figure 6.2). The function parent(x) returns the parent of node x.
The function att(x) is defined only if x is a leaf node and denotes the attribute associated
with the leaf node x. The function index(x) returns an ordering number associated with
node x.
Let T be an access tree with root ‘r’. Denote by Tx the subtree of T rooted at the node
‘x’. Hence T is the same as Tr. If a set of health attributes ω satisfies the access tree Tx,
we denote it as Tx(ω) = 1. We compute Tx(ω) recursively as follows:
If ‘x’ is a non-leaf node, evaluate Tz(ω) for all children z of node ‘x’. Tx(ω) returns 1
if and only if at least kx children return 1. If ‘x’ is a leaf node, then Tx(ω) returns 1 if and
only if att(x) ∈ ω.
Data formation and authentication: Before encrypting the data packets, the
trusted eHealth care provider classifies the data set based on some privacy levels and
assign some attributes on that message block (M). It then concatenates the message block
(M), user pseudo identity UPID, and the session id. After that the trusted eHealth care
provider computes the token value T = H2(M |UPID|session id). It then computes the
signature using the equation 6.3. Local health care provider will store the block sequence
and patient pseudo identity for future verification. Figure 6.4 shows the data packet struc-
ture. The health cloud service provider will check the message authenticity by verify the
signature using the equation 6.4.
M0 M1 ………. MnM=
Message block
Block ID Signature Hash value (T) Session key Encrypted Message
Data packet structure
Figure 6.4: Data packet architecture
The health cloud service provider will generate the signature in the same way and store
along with the encrypted messages for the data requester verification purposes.
Encrypt2(PK,M,T) : The algorithm first chooses a polynomial qx for each node x in
the tree T . These polynomials are chosen in a top-down manner, starting from the root
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node. For each node x in the tree, set the degree dx of the polynomial qx to be one less
than the threshold value of kx. Starting with the root node ‘R’, the algorithm chooses a
random s ∈ Zp and sets qR(0) = s. Then it chooses dR other points of the polynomial qR
randomly to define it completely. For any other node x, it sets qx(0) = qparent(x)(index(x))
and chooses dx other points randomly to completely define qx.Finally, the ciphertext is
then constructed by giving the access tree structure T and compute
CT = (T, C ‘ = Me(g, g)αs, C = hs,∀y ∈ Y : Cy = gqy(0), C ‘y = H(att(y))qy(0)) (6.5)
KeyGen(MK,S): The key generation algorithm takes as input a set of attributes S
and outputs a key that identifies with the set. The algorithm first chooses a random r ∈ Zp,
and then random rj ∈ Zp for each attribute j ∈ S, and outputs the key as
SK = (D = gα+r)/β,∀j ∈ S : Dj = gr.H(j)rj , D‘j = grj) (6.6)
Decrypt2(CT,SK) : The decryption procedure works as recursively and is defined by
the function DecryptNode(CT, Sk, x) that takes as input a ciphertext CT and a private
key SK. If the node x is a leaf node, then the function works as follows:
DecryptNode(CT, SK, x) = e(Di,Cx)
e(D‘i,C
‘
x)
= e(g
r.H(i)ri ,hqx(0))
e(gri ,H(i)qx(0))
= e(g, g)rqx(0)
Here i ∈ S. If i /∈ S, we define DecryptNode(CT, Sk, x) = ⊥. When x is a non-
leaf node, the algorithm is called by its all child nodes z. It then stores the output of
DecryptNode(CT, Sk, z) as Fz. Detail is shown in [74]. If the data requester can submit
all the attributes correctly, the algorithm then executes on the root node ‘R’. If the tree
is satisfied by S, we set A = DecryptNode(CT, SK, r) = e(g, g)rqR(0) = e(g, g)rs. The
message ‘M’ can be decrypted by computing
C ‘/(e(C,D)/A) = C ‘/(e(hs, g(α+r)/β)/e(g, g)rs) = M
6.6 Security Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the security and privacy issues of the proposed scheme.
The ESPAC scheme ensures user and eHealth agent’s identity privacy: User
and health agent use pseudo identity instead of their unique identity, and these pseudo
identities are generated by a strong one-way hash function. The construction of the hash
function is easy to sample and compute but hard to invert. Therefore, the privacy is
ensured by the proposed scheme.
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The scheme is secure to chosen ciphertext-only attack: Data transmissions
from user to health agent, as well as from health agent to health cloud service provider are
done with proper encryption schemes (Encryption1 and Encryption2). The processes are
indistinguishable under chosen ciphertext attack based on the BDH problem hardness and
this hardness ensures there is no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that can decrypt
the message from a set of chosen ciphertext.
The scheme is resistant to the eavesdropping and collusion attacks: An eaves-
dropping attacker aims at accessing the private and sensitive patient’s medical data. This
attack may be happened during the patient to eHealth care provider or eHealth care
provider to the health cloud data communication. The BDH hardness ensures that the
proposed scheme is resistant to this eavesdropping attack. To access the data at the health
cloud server, an attacker needs to has sufficient attributes to complete the access tree.
Here the random number ‘s’ is divide into multiple shares based on the attributes set.
For the non-privacy data set, he may get access and its allowed in our scheme. But he
can’t modified the data due to the verification bindings. However, for the patient sensitive
data, a unique random number is embedded into both ‘C’ and ‘D’ of the equation shown
in the Decrypt2(CT, SK) function. Without knowing that secret number, it is impossible
to access the data in a probabilistic polynomial time. This hardness also demonstrates our
scheme as a resistant to the collusion attack. Therefore, any attacker cannot successfully
launch the eavesdropping or collusion attack to our proposed scheme.
The scheme ensures message integrity, non-repudiation, and source authen-
tication: We use the patient’s secret key and the session identity to generate the signature
‘S’ (Equ.6.3). The data receiver can verifies the signature by using the public parameters
of the sender, shown in the Equ. 6.4. This verification ensures the corresponding source
authentication. The scheme generates the message token value ‘T’ by computing the hash
value of the concatenated message, patient’s identity (PID), and a session sequence num-
ber. Only the patient and the eHealth care provider know the patient’s original identity
and the session sequence number. This token value is also used to generate the signature
‘S’. Therefore the message integrity with non-repudiation can be provided by our proposed
scheme.
ESPAC ensures backward and forward secrecy: The scheme prevents user to
access the plaintext before providing the required attributes that satisfy the access policy.
On the other hand, any user who drops an attribute should be prevented from accessing the
plaintext of the subsequent data exchanged after he drops the attribute, unless the other
attributes that he is holding satisfy the access policy. Thus, ESPAC ensures backwards
and forward secrecy.
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6.7 Performance Analysis
To evaluate the performance of the presented ESPAC, we first show the timing cost of
operations used in ESPAC. We evaluate the computation timing cost by varying number
of attributes. Finally, we analyze the performance of ESPAC to resist DoS attack, and
conduct a simulation using NS 2.33.
Time cost: Based on the open source project CP-ABE [88], we evaluate computation
time of attribute-based encryption and decryption in a Pentium-IV 3-GHz PC that has 1-
GB of RAM. We varying the number of attributes from ‘2’ to ‘40’ and make different access-
policies based on these attributes. Encryption and Decryption functions are executed on
a 512-byte data-block. Simulation results show that computation time of Encryption2 is
increasing linearly with number of attributes, shown in Figure 6.5. Decryption2 needs
less computation time compare to Encryption2. When the number of attributes is ‘2’,
Encryption2 and Decryption2 take 76 ms and 45 ms, respectively. These computation
time reaches to 962 ms and 372 ms, when the number of attributes is altered to 40. Time
cost of ESPAC operations is given in table 6.1.
Figure 6.5: Computation time of encryption and decryption with different no. of attributes
Table 6.1: Time cost for ESPAC operations
Operation Time Operation Time
Encryption1 Ce Signature Cm
Verification Ce Decryption1 Ce
Encryption2 Ce + 2Cm Decryption2 2Ce + Cm
We denote by Ce a computation of the pairing, and Cm a scalar multiplication in G1.
Usually, pairing operations cost is much more than other computations. A single pairing
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Ce needs about 10 times more time to compute than a scalar multiplication Cm [52], and
our simulation shows a single pairing needs around 65ms to compute. We consider 550ms
as the computation time for the pairing using a PDA [71] for further network analysis.
Analysis: The system blocking probability can be increased by high data rate traffic,
or accessing the system by a large number of misbehaving users at a time. This increased
rate of blocking probability is considered as a cause of DoS attack. In our analysis, we aim
to minimize the blocking probability by restricting data rate and using multiple servers. We
assume that the service provider serves multiple users. Users demand services according
to a Poisson process and request independent and identical distributed exponential service
time. We use M/M/1/K and M/M/m/K queuing model for analysis and assume that the
blocking probability should be less than 30% to provide adequate Quality of Service (QoS)
to the users. Blocking probability P1(K) and Pm(K) of the M/M/1/K and M/M/m/K
queue respectively can be written as follow:
P1(K) =
1−ρ
1−ρK+1ρ
i and Pm(K) =
ρm/m!∑K
i=0
ρi
i!
; for ρ = λ
µ
6= 1 and 0 ≤ i ≤ K.
Derivation of above equations can be found in [89]. We consider the arrival rates λ
for the normal and high data rate traffic are 3 and 6 per unit of time, respectively, while
the service rate µ = 10 is fixed. The number of users, K, varies from 0 to 50. For the
M/M/m/K queue, the number of servers m = 2.
Figure 6.6 shows that high data rate (HDR) created by malicious users causes high
blocking probability compared to normal data rate (NDR), and ineffective to maintain
QoS level for more than 10 users. We can use multiple server with fixed upper bound of
the data rate to resist the DoS attack, and to ensure the required QoS with an acceptable
number of users.
eHealth care scenario: We consider two types of users, wired and wireless, are connected
to the eHealth care service provider. The eHealth care provider is linked to the cloud server
through a wired connection. We define two types of scenarios, normal scenario (NrS) and
high-dense scenario (HdS), in our model. NrS consists of 5 mobile users and 3 users with
wired connection. For the HdS, we just double the respective numbers.
Network simulation: Based on the theoretical analysis, we consider NrS, and HdS
with single and duel server in our simulation. The performance metric used in our simu-
lation is end-to-end delay, and all the wireless users are assumed to be in the access-point
communication range. Table. 6.2 gives the different parameters used in our simulation.
Figure 6.7 shows the average end-to-end delay of the different scenarios using the ES-
PAC scheme.
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Figure 6.6: Queuing comparisons for the QoS requirements
Figure 6.7: Comparison of average end-to-end delay
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Table 6.2: Simulation Parameters
Simulation time 150 sec
Number of nodes NrS [wireless 5, wired 3]
HdS [wireless 10, wired 6]
Packet type wireless-CBR, Wired-TCP
Packet size 512 bytes
Mobility 2-5 Km/hr [for wireless users]
Simulation results show that the average end-to-end delay of the proposed scheme is
around 750 ms in a normal scenario and increases to 900 ms in a high-dense scenario, which
is minimized to 800 ms by using the duel server. Based on the performance analyses, we
can apply ESPAC scheme in a duel server mode to resist DOS attack and provide a high
QoS level for users.
Key Storage Efficiency: Compared to the traditional access-control schemes, ES-
PAC’s users do not need to store data requesters’ IDs. In the initialization phase, TA
computes the constant size PK and MK. Service providers or registered users only need
to store the assigned attributes keys. Let, N is the average size of attributes and ‘c’ is the
number of assigned attributes. Thus, the storage overhead is O(c logN). The proposed
scheme ensures users’ storage efficiency as they do not need to store data-requesters IDs
for future access control. In a trusted environment, they may even release more storage
space by storing the access-policy in the trusted service provider end.
6.8 M-ESPAC:Modified ESPAC for User Revocation
and Audit
There is a drawback of our first proposed ESPAC scheme. If the data requester can
submit all the attributes correctly, CP-ABE executes on the root node of the access tree
and decrypt the encrypted PHI. This can open the door of potential privacy exposure, as
the cloud can collide with data requester to get access to the PHI too. To perform user
revocation, the cloud needs to re-encrypts all stored PHI with different access architecture.
It costs a huge computation overhead to the cloud and increases the eHealth expenditure
because cloud service provider (CSP) will demand more service cost to perform additional
computation tasks. In addition, it is not practical to delegate all access control tasks to
the third party CSP [87].
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To solve the ESPAC’s drawbacks as well as to incorporate cloud services to eHealth, we
perform modification on ESPAC and propose a multi-parties proxy re-encryption scheme
with CP-ABE named as M-ESPAC. In addition, proposed M-ESPAC ensures PHI owner,
respective health service provider (HSP), and cloud service provider (CSP) participation
to provide reliable, secure, and privacy preserving eHealth care system. In the modified
proposed scheme, HSP can easily rebuild the PHI access architecture without doing any
computation at the cloud site. As well as auditing of the stored PHI needs minimum
computation.
6.8.1 Multi-parties Proxy Re-encryption Protocol
To ensure authentic patient-centric access control in a cloud environment where only a spe-
cific DAR can decrypt the encrypted PHI, we propose a multi-parties proxy re-encryption
protocol. In our proposed protocol, the HSP and CSP are identified as multi-parties proxies
and they share their secret keys to generate the re-encryption key. Re-encryption process
performs such a way that neither HSP nor CSP can deny their involvement in the PHI
access process, as well as only the specific DAR can decrypt the re-encrypted PHI. Fig.
6.8 shows the framework of proposed multi-parties proxy re-encryption protocol.
6.8.2 System Initialization
Given the security parameter S, the trusted authority HSP generates the bilinear pa-
rameters (q, g, e,G,GT) by the function Gen(S). It also generates a secure hash function
H : (0, 1)∗ → G. By using the available public security parameters, HSP and CSP choose
random numbers h ∈R Z∗q and c ∈R Z∗q as there secret keys respectively and corresponding
public keys are generated as PKHSP = g
h and PKCSP = g
c. Each registered patient has
a unique identity Ui ∈ U , U = U0..Un is the set of patients enlisted to a HSP, and chooses
a random number xi ∈R Z∗q as its private key. The patient then computes the public key
as PKUi = g
xi .
HSP computes patient pseudo-identity PIDUi = H(Ui) and constructs different access
trees based on PHI privacy level. Fig. 6.2 shows possible access structure based on different
privacy levels, where intermediate node work as a logic gate. For example, any DAR who
knows location and gender, or gender and disease, or location and disease can get access to
the privacy level-1 type of PHI as shown in Fig. 6.2(a). Patient chooses ρ1..n ∈ Z∗q as secret
keys for different privacy levels’ PHI and constructs respective access trees A1..An, where
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Figure 6.8: Framework of multi-parties proxy re-encryption protocol
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the polynomial of the trees’ root are set as ρ1..n ∈ Z∗q. Secret keys are then encrypted by
using the Encrypt2 function described in ESPAC.
Trusted HSP maintains a secure records that contains patient’s identity, pseudo identity,
and secret keys for different privacy levels. In our proposed scheme, a set of PHI with
different privacy levels form a PHI-block and the HSP signs on this block before sending
to CSP for permanent storage. A sample PHI block structure is presented in Fig.6.9.
M0  
(Level-1)
M1  
(Level-3)
M2  
(Level-1)
Mn  
(Level-2)
· · Sigblock
Block ID: XXXX – XXXX - XXXX
Block ID
Patient ID
HSP ID
Figure 6.9: Sample PHI block architecture
6.8.3 Communication Between Patient and HSP
Step-1) Patient U0 and HSP with private and public key pairs (x0, g
x0) and (h, gh) compute
first the shared key KuH = PK
x0
HSP = PK
h
U0
= ghx0 . Patient U0 encrypts the PHI ’m’ as
E = m ×KuH and signed the message as SigE = PK
1
H(E||m||PIDU0 )+x0
HSP . Patient then sends
the encrypted PHI along with the digital signature to the specific HSP.
Step-2) After receiving the encrypted message E, and corresponding signature SigE, the
HSP decrypts it asm = E×KuH and check the validity of the signature as e(SigE, gH(E||m||PIDU0 ).PKU0) ?=
e(PKHSP , g).
e(SigE, g
H(E||m||PIDU0 ).PKU0)
= e(PK
1
H(E||m||PIDU0 )+x0
HSP , g
H(E||m||PIDU0 )+x0)
= e(PKHSP , g).
6.8.4 PHI Encryption Based on Privacy
If the validity of the signature SignE verified, the HSP encrypts the PHI ’m’ according
the patient’s predefined privacy setting. Let HSP founds the decrypted PHI ’m’ is a type
of level-1. It then performs the following steps:
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Step-3) Regenerates encryption key as K = e(PKU0 , g
1
h )ρ1 = e(g, g)
ρ1·x0
h and encrypts
the PHI ’m’ as M0 = K × m. HSP obtains the secret key ρ1 from its secure record or
obtains from the access tree.
Step-4) HSP signs the encrypted message M0 as SigM = PK
1
H(M0||MessageID)+h
CSP , here h
is the secret key of the HSP and MessageID represents an unique identity of the message
(adding message position with block ID).
Step-5) Stores v0 = H(M0) temporally and sends M0 and SignM to the CSP. HSP
performs step-3 and 4 for others PHI of a block.
Step-6) After successful transmitting of all the PHI of a block, HSP computes the block
sign as Sigblock = PK
1
v0+V1..+Vn+x0+H(BlockID)
CSP . Here, V0, .., Vn are the values of H(M0)..H(Mn)
respectively.
6.8.5 Storing PHI at Cloud
CSP performs following steps before storing the patient’s encrypted PHI at cloud.
Step-7) Checks the validity of the received encrypted PHI, M0, by using the digital
signature SigM as e(SigM , g
H(M0||MessageID).PKHSP )
?
= e(PKCSP , g)
e(SigM , g
H(M0||MessageID).PKHSP )
= e(PK
1
H(M0||MessageID)+h
CSP , g
H(M0||MessageID)+h)
= e(PKCSP , g).
Step-8) If the signature verified successfully, CSP computes V0 = H(M0) and stores
both M0 and v0 temporally. Steps 6 and 7 continue until all the encrypted PHI of a block
(M0..Mn) are successfully received and verified.
Step-9) Check the validity of the Sigblock as e(Sigblock, g
V0+..+Vn+H(BlockID).PKHSP )
?
=
e(PKCSP , g)
e(Sigblock, g
V0+..+Vn+H(BlockID).PKHSP )
= e(PK
1
v0+V1..+Vn+x0+H(BlockID)
CSP , g
V0+..+Vn+H(BlockID)+x0)
= e(PKCSP , g).
Step-10) If step-9 performs successfully, CSP stores all the encrypted PHI and the
corresponding Sigblock as shown in Fig.6.9.
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6.8.6 PHI Access and Multi-parties Proxy Re-encryption
In this subsection, we define the steps those are needed by DAR, HSP, and CSP to get
access to sensitive encrypted PHI.
Step-11) DAR sends access request to CSP with attributes set of a specific patient.
CSP forwards attributes set along with DAR’s public key to the HSP.
Step-12) HSP executes AccessCheck() andDecrypt2() [83] to check the access privileges
of the DAR. If the DAR can submit all the required attributes correctly, the function
obtains the corresponding secret key ρ.
In our proposed scheme, HSP and CSP perform as multi parties proxies to re-encrypt
the specific encrypted PHI which can only decrypt by the DAR.
proxy Re-encryption at HSP
HSP now computes a re-encryption key for the DAR, so that he can easily decrypt the
re-encrypted PHI.
Step-13) Generates the re-encryption key as K´ = e(PKU0 , PKDAR)
ρ1
h = e(g, g)
d·x0·ρ1
h ,
here ρ1 is the secret key of a specific PHI privacy level that obtains by the function
AccessCheck().
Step-14) HSP chooses a session key s ∈ Z∗q and re-encrypts M0 as M = M0 ×
e(PKcsp, g)
s = M0 × e(g, g)c·s
Step-15) Generates a shared key by using CSP’s public key and HSP’s secret key as
described in step 1. Encrypts K´ and s using this shared key. HSP then signs on M as
described in step-1.
Step-16) HSP transmits M , signature on M , encrypted K´, and s to CSP.
Proxy Re-encryption at CSP
In this stage, CSP first checks the validity of M (step-2)and generates the shared key using
HSP’s public key and CSP’s secret key and decrypts the session key s (step-2).
Step-17) CSP re-encrypts M as M´ = M
e(g,g)c·s . It then calculates shared key between
CSP and DAR.
Step-18) By using the shared key, encrypts the key K´ and signs on M´ and transmits
to DAR.
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6.8.7 PHI access by DAR
Step-19) After receiving encrypted PHI M´ and signature, DAR checks the validity of the
message as shown in step-2.
Step-20) DAR then decrypts the PHI as M
K´
1
d
= m×e(g,g)
ρ0·x0
h
e(g,g)
d·x0·ρ0
h·d
= m
6.9 Audit of Stored PHI
In our proposed SPS scheme, trusted HSP can perform block or partial audit of stored
encrypted PHI to ensure CSP performs as expected.
6.9.1 Partial Audit
HSP performs partial audit to minimize the computation and communication cost. In
this case, HSP audits any PHI unit of a block and checks the validity with stored block
signature Sigblock.
Step-1) HSP chooses a random PHI address from any data block. It then sends request
message to the CSP to deliver the specific encrypted PHI, Hashed values of others PHI
stored in the same block along with the block signature.
Let HSP asks for M1 of a block. CSP computes Vi = H(Mi), for all i 6= 1, where
i ∈ [0, n]. Sends back computed hashed values, stored encrypted PHI M1, and signature
Sigblock to HSP.
Step-2) HSP now decrypts M1, check the contents, encrypts again with the same privacy
level’s secret key and computes the hash value v1. It then checks the validity of signblock
as e(Signblock,
n∏
i=0
gvi ·gH(BlockID) ·gx0) ?= e(PKCSP , g). If this challenge verified, HSP sends
acknowledge message to CSP and terminates the partial auditing task.
Correctness:
e(Signblock,
n∏
i=0
gvi ·gH(BlockID)·gx0) = e(PK
1
v0+...+Vn+H(BlockID)+x0
CSP , g
v0+..+vn+H(BlockID)+x0) =
e(PKCSP , g).
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6.9.2 Block Audit
HSP requests for all encrypted PHI (M0..Mn) of any random block. It then computes the
hashed values v0..vn and checks the validity of the block signature as shown in step-2 of
partial audit subsection. By the block audit, HSP can assure correctness of the stored PHI
block.
6.10 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a scheme,ESPAC, to achieve patient-centric access con-
trol with security and privacy by exploiting attribute-based encryption. Moreover ESPAC
enables the eHealth care service provider to reduce the overall maintaining cost by moving
data to a centralized storage or cloud storage for further processing and long-term storage.
Moreover, storing PHIs in the cloud storage provides anytime, anywhere access to stored
patient’s health information. The proposed scheme also preserves user privacy with data
integrity. Through detailed security and performance analyses, it has been demonstrated
that the proposed scheme is highly efficient to resist various possible attacks and malicious
behavior. We further modified ESPAC by introducing multi-parties proxy re-encryption
and ensure participation of both HSP and CSP to grant access of encrypted PHI to a
specific DAR.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we summarize our contributions in this thesis, propose our future research
work, and give final remarks.
7.1 Conclusions
The major contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
• First, we studied different PHI aggregation scenarios based on patient’s location
and summarized basic security and privacy requirements for eHealth applications.
We then proposed a light-weight hybrid secure communication scheme for WBAN,
where session key ensures body sensor reusability. Considering PDA as the gateway of
WBAN, we then prioritized health care data packets and ensure QoS with acceptable
security and privacy bindings.
• Second, we proposed a secure packet forwarding protocol,ASTP, based on mutual
trust and integrated with trustworthiness to Agent, energy level, residential time, and
priority to the same Agent’s subscriber in a cooperative heterogeneous network. The
proposed protocol works in a cooperative social environment, where other cooperative
users help to establish a secure communication link between care giver and end user.
The ASTP protocol can remarkably increase the average packet delivery ratio and
achieve excellent efficiency to be used in an eHealth application. Power efficiency at
the user level is maintained by computing major calculation at the Agent side. User
privacy is ensured using pseudo identity. Fairness is achieved by providing incentive
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to the cooperative intermediate routing nodes. Through detailed security analyses,
it has been demonstrated that the ASTP is highly effective to resist various possible
security attacks and malicious behavior.
• Third, we proposed a delay-tolerant secure long-term health care system, Rural-
Care, for monitoring patients located at the rural-area. RuralCare ensures secure
and privacy preserving data aggregation using body sensors in WBAN environment
and vehicles as cooperative relay nodes. It describes data forwarding steps from
the patient’s end to the care-giver’s end and achieves different security and privacy
requirements. The fairness among all cooperative participants in RuralCare is guar-
anteed by adopting proper incentive and reputation policies. These policies also
improve the network performance in terms of high delivery ratio and low average de-
lay. Through extensive security and performance analyses, it has been demonstrated
that RuralCare is highly effective to resist possible security attacks and efficient to
provide emerging health care to patient resides at the rural area.
• Fourth, we proposed secure and efficient PHI sharing schemes (ESPAC and M-
ESPAC) in a cloud computing environment. Proposed schemes ensure patient-centric
access control by exploiting attribute-based encryption. Moreover, overall maintain-
ing cost is minimized by performing less computation at the cloud side. ESPAC and
M-ESPAC preserve patient’s identity privacy and data integrity. Proposed multi-
parties proxy re-encryption protocol ensured participation from both HSP and CSP
to grant access of encrypted PHI for a specific DAR. Stored PHI correctness is main-
tained by block-auditing that can be performed by the TA.
7.2 Future Work
Our research has already made significant progress in secure eHealth care applications.
However, since cloud storage and delay tolerant network using vehicular social network
are the promising platform for PHI storage and providing health care to rural area, there
still exist several research direction to be explored to complement this thesis. Therefore,
the following two research topics will be investigated as a continuation of my Ph.D. thesis
work.
• Searching on encrypted stored PHI: In a continuous health monitoring system, a
large amount of PHI are going to be stored at the cloud side frequently. Due to the
sensitiveness of the stored PHI, care giver would like to encrypt the PHI to ensure
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access restriction. However, this large amount of data is very much valuable to the
health workers, researchers, pharmacist, or care givers. They would like to perform
different search queries and the system should allow them to have an advancement in
health care industry. Therefore, as one of our future research work for cloud storage,
we will propose an access policy with general search option on encrypted PHI.
• Supporting reputation-based trust in Vehicular Social Networks: In a Delay tolerant
network, participant vehicles could maintain a blacklist which is helpful for selecting
nearby trusted peers. In addition, the vehicles are more likely to share their blacklists
with others in vehicular social networks. Then, the black-list can be considered as
trust value and minimize the number of malicious relay nodes.
7.3 Final Remarks
In this thesis, we have presented a suite of security and privacy-preserving protocols for
secure eHealth care system. In addition, we have also identified two future research topics
to complement of this thesis. To facilitate our research accomplishments and findings to
benefit the real world situations, we will carry out experiments to further confirm our
research findings.
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